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NOTE
DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND THE COMMONWEALTH'S RIGHT TO
WRITS OF ERROR IN CRIMINAL CASES*
In the 1986 legislative session, the Virginia General Assembly at-
tempted to produce a constitutional amendment designed to expand the
right of Commonwealth's Attorneys to appeal criminal cases. The Vir-
ginia Constitution prohibits appeals by the commonwealth in criminal
cases in which the accused might be sentenced to death or imprisonment,
unless the case involves state revenue.1 Advocates of an amendment to
expand prosecutorial appeals have never fully explained the historical
context of the prohibition against such appeals and their complex rela-
tionship to other constitutional, statutory, and common law provisions.
The subject of prosecutorial appeals involves such fundamental legal is-
sues as former jeopardy, justification for the dismissal of a jury before
verdict, the finality of judgments, and the reviewability of interlocutory
orders. The piecemeal evolution of doctrines in these areas from the Eng-
lish common law to their present state has entangled the concept of crim-
inal appeals by the commonwealth in a web of technical confusion. The
issue of prosecutorial appeals also involves a confrontation between the
public's interest in access to appellate review and the individual's interest
in freedom from harassment and persecution by a powerful government.
This article demonstrates that few types of prosecutorial appeals are in-
consistent with other legal principles and suggests that greater access to
appellate review would enhance the state's ability to protect society from
crime without unfairly burdening the individual accused.
The first section of this article explores the development of the concept
of former jeopardy and the plea of autrefois acquit in the common law of
England.2 The second section discusses how these common law doctrines
were modified and applied in the United States.3 Because the concept of
double jeopardy limits the scope of prosecutorial appeals, the second sec-
tion also outlines the current federal standards concerning double jeop-
* This note was written by Roger D. Scott, J.D., 1986, University of Virginia, based on a
one-year research project which he performed at the University of Virginia.
1. VA. CONsT. art. VI, § 1. "No appeal shall be allowed to the Commonwealth in a case
involving the life and liberty of a person, except that an appeal by the Commonwealth may
be allowed in any case involving the violation of a law relating to the State revenue."
2. See infra notes 8-50 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
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ardy and prosecutorial appeals.4 The third section traces the development
of the double jeopardy concept, the jury discharge rule, and the limit on
prosecutorial appeals in Virginia.' An historical analysis of these concepts
will demonstrate the fallacy of having incorporated into the 1902 Virginia
Constitution an overly specific provision against prosecutorial appeals.
The fourth section addresses the measures which should be taken to
bring Virginia law into conformity with the practice in the overwhelming
majority of the states and in the federal courts, suggesting that the Vir-
ginia Constitution be amended to allow more appeals by the common-
wealth.' This section concludes the article by presenting a model statute
designed .to implement a broader right of appeal.7
I. THE COMMON LAW BACKGROUND
A. Former Jeopardy
It is fairly well settled that the concept of double jeopardy did not exist
in Anglo-Saxon law." Whether the concept came to England through the
ecclesiastical law or the civil law,9 it was probably established in England
in the twelfth century, shortly after the Norman Conquest, where it re-
mains today an astonishingly simple legal doctrine. In contrast, one of the
most enigmatic features of modern American law is its hypertrophied
double jeopardy doctrine.
The guarantee against subjecting the accused to a second trial for the
same offense would have been especially precious in medieval England
where the penalties upon conviction of a serious offense were extremely
harsh, most frequently death or disfigurement.' 0 In early English law, a
4. See infra notes 74-80, 102 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 127-70 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 180-214 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 215-25 and accompanying text.
8. Under the pre-Conquest criminal laws of King Cnut, King of England 1016-1035 A.D.,
trials for crime were by ordeal and habitual criminals were subjected to the "triple ordeal"
(tried thrice). Prescribed penalties for failure at the second ordeal were removal of the
hands, feet, or both. Penalties for failure at the third ordeal included blinding, excision of
the nose, ears and upper lip, or scalping. Secular Laws of King Cnut, § 30, reprinted in 1
ANCIENT LAWS AND INSTITUTES OF ENGLAND 393-95 (1840).
9. Note, Double Jeopardy and Dual Sovereigns, 35 IND. L.J. 444, 446-47 (1960).
10. The Dantean penalty for false accusation was excision of the tongue. Secular Laws of
King Cnut, § 16, reprinted in 1 ANCIENT LAWS AND INSTITUTES OF ENGLAND, supra note 8, at
385. Slaves could be branded for a first offense and decapitated for a second offense. Id. at
397. "Untrustworthy men" who were "regarded with suspicion by the general public," and
any who defended them, could be slain. Id. In order that those convicted under his laws
might serve as living examples of his ready justice, William the .Conqueror, King of England
1066-1087, banned the death penalty and required instead castration, blinding, or the re-
moval of the hands or feet. 3 Willelmi Articuli Retractatis 17, reprinted in 1 ANCIENT LAWS
AND INSTITUTES OF ENGLAND, supra note 8, at 494. Henry I, King of England 1100-1135,
reinstituted the death penalty by hanging or flaying. Leges Regis Henrici Primi §§ 12.2,
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second accusation could quite literally twice place the defendant "in jeop-
ardy of life or limb.""" The influence of continental law after the Norman
Conquest, however, was probably responsible for the formalization of the
countervailing pleas in bar of a second indictment, autrefois acquit and
autrefois convict. 2
The concept of double jeopardy received its first detailed treatment in
the writings of Sir Edward Coke, who forged a workable doctrine from
scattered sources.1 3 Coke's writings on double jeopardy established what
is still the basic law on the subject in England. In Vaux's Case,'4 William
Vaux, indicted for murder, answered that he had previously been indicted
for the same offense and had been acquitted. However, because the first
indictment had been defective in form, Vaux was not entitled to a plea of
autrefois acquit.'5 "When the offender is discharged upon an insufficient
indictment, there the law has not had its end; nor was the life of the
party, in the judgment of the law, ever in jeopardy; and the wisdom of the
law abhors that great offences should go unpunished .. . ."I' A former
valid indictment, trial on the merits, and acquittal based upon a determi-
nation of factual innocence were established as prerequisites to the valid-
75.1, reprinted in 1 ANCIENT LAWS AND INSTITUTES OF ENGLAND, supra note 8, at 523, 579.
Many lesser crimes were punishable by fines, but under King Henry, the punishment for
second offenses was almost always death or mutilation. J. STEPHEN, 1 A HISTORY OF THE
CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 58 (London 1883); see also THE CHRONICLE OF FLORENCE OF
WORCESTER 216 (T. Forester trans. London 1854).
11. Until very late, the defense of former jeopardy was available only in cases of felony in
which "life or limb" sentences could be awarded. Misdemeanor cases were punishable only
by fine or a short term of imprisonment. 2 W. STAUNDFORDE, LESS PLEES DEL CORON 106
(London 1583). Doubt still existed whether a plea of former jeopardy would be available in
misdemeanor cases into the twentieth century. 17 AMERICAN AND ENGLISH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
LAW, Jeopardy 582 (2d ed. 1900).
12. These maxims are both translated as "no one should be punished twice for the same
offense." M. FRIEDLAND, DOUBLE JEOPARDY 5-6 (1969). It is impossible to determine when
these pleas were first introduced. The case of Richard Old in 1203, 1 SELECT PLEAS OF THE
CROWN 33 (F. Maitland ed. 1888), is the first recorded instance in English law of what ap-
pears to be a dismissal on the basis of a prior acquittal. The defendant was accused of
murder and presented the defense that he and others had already been tried and acquitted
of this murder. This defense, however, was not the only grounds for which the case was
dismissed. It is not known for certain whether the plea of former acquittal standing alone
would have resulted in a dismissal. Old's Case was an "appeal," a privately instituted pro-
ceeding, used in addition to proceedings instituted by the Crown to enforce early criminal
law. See 1 AMERICAN AND ENGLISH ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF LAW, Appeal 628 (1887). The plea of
former judgment based on a private appeal was at first not valid against a subsequent action
by the Crown, although such a plea could preclude additional appeals. W. STAUNDFORDE,
supra note 11, at 106.
13. See Sigler, A History of Double Jeopardy, 7 ANL J. LEGAL HIST. 283, 288-95 (1963)
(surveying English cases and treatises containing primitive concepts of former jeopardy
before Coke).
14. 4 Co. Rep. 44a, 76 Eng. Rep. 992 (K.B. 1591).
15. Id. at 45a, 76 Eng. Rep. at 993.
16. Id. at 45a, 76 Eng. Rep. at 994.
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ity of a plea in bar of a second indictment for the same offense.' 7
The pleas of autrefois acquit and convict implemented the concept of
former jeopardy and were founded upon a doctrine similar to res judi-
cata, which holds that only a valid final judgment on the merits bars a
subsequent suit.'8
The rule that only a judgment of acquittal on the merits can bar rep-
rosecution rings out clearly in English law from the Renaissance to the
present. 19 The accused is protected from being twice adjudged, not from
being twice subjected to legal proceedings. One accused of a crime might
be in jeopardy of an adverse verdict as soon as a jury is in place, but he
has not been in jeopardy of a lawful execution against his "life or limb"
until a verdict and judgment have been given.20 The early English rule
emphasized the factual innocence or guilt of the accused; he could not
have repose from the rigors of the criminal law until his guilt or inno-
cence had been determined by a jury in legally correct proceedings.2 The
accused could not take advantage of technical errors committed by the
prosecutor. 22
B. The Jury Discharge Rule
Another unrelated English common law rule would later collide with
the law of double jeopardy in America: the jury in a capital case should
not be discharged prior to rendering a verdict, absent pressing necessity.
The rule against pre-verdict discharge of the jury seems to have been
founded upon considerations for both the accused and the government.
Trial by jury was a fundamental right. Once the accused was in the
charge of the jury, only the jury could decide his fate and only by unani-
17. Id. at 45a, 76 Eng. Rep. at 993.
18. Through dictum in Vaux, Coke expressed the theory that a defendant could be tried
again if convicted upon a defective indictment, as long as judgment had not been entered.
Id. In English criminal law at Coke's time, a defendant could be tried a second time, regard-
less of the verdict, if a formal and legally sound final judgment had not been entered. In
Wrote v. Wigges, 4 Co. Rep. 45b, 76 Eng. Rep. 994 (1591), the defendant confessed to man-
slaughter, but obtained clemency for the crime by claiming "benefit of clergy," such that no
formal judgment against him was entered. Here again, Coke stated that the defendant had
never been in jeopardy. Id. at 47a, 76 Eng. Rep. at 998.
19. E.g., Rex v. Elia, 2 All Eng. Rep. 587 (1968).
20. When we talk of a man being twice tried, we mean a trial which proceeds to its legiti-
mate and lawful conclusion by verdict; and when we speak of a man being twice put
in jeopardy, we mean put in jeopardy by the verdict of a jury; and he is not tried nor
put in jeopardy until the verdict is given.
The Queen v. Charlesworth, 1 B. & S. 460, 507, 121 Eng. Rep. 786, 804 (K.B. 1861).
21. Vaux's Case, 4 Co. Rep. 44a, 76 Eng. Rep. 992 (K.B. 1591).
22. The King v. Gilchrist, 168 Eng. Rep. 430, 2 Leach 657 (1795) (prisoner discharged
from proceedings under defective indictment and remanded to prison to await
reprosecution).
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mous verdict.23 The jury discharge rule expedited to conclusion the many
cases heard by a travelling tribunal with a busy itinerary, accelerating the
delivery of a unanimous verdict. This rule seems to have originated as a
fabrication by Coke,24 resting on no authority other than its own persua-
sive force.25 Coke admitted no exceptions to the jury discharge rule.
During the seventeenth century reign of the Stuarts, however, courts
began to discharge juries freely, permitting reprosecution when there ap-
peared to be new evidence highly probative of guilt.2 SThere was much
dissatisfaction with this harsh practice, and in 1698, the rigor of Coke's
rule was restored. In The King v. Perkins,27 Chief Justice Holt declared
that in a capital case the jury could not be discharged, even with the
consent of the accused and the prosecutor; in a non-capital case only the
consent of both the prosecutor and the accused could empower the judge
to withdraw even a single juror.28
Arguments in favor of at least a limited discretionary power of the trial
judge to discharge the jury ensued, and, in 1746, The King v. Kinloch2 9
overruled Perkins. After prolonged study of this controversial issue, the
Kinloch court held that juries should be discharged in cases where the
circumstances of the prisoner or the demands of public justice so
23. P. DEVLIN, TRIAL BY JURY 75, 78 (1956).
24. "A jury sworn and charged in case of life or member cannot be discharged by the
court or any other, but they ought to give a verdict." 1 E. COKE, INSTITUTES *227b (1628);
see also 3 E. COKE, INSTITUTES *110 (1644). Note the applicability of this rule to cases of
"life or member," echoing the phrase "jeopardy of life or limb." The similarity of the word
formulas probably contributed much later to the confusion of the two rules.
25. Commonwealth v. Cook, 6 Serg. & Rawle 577, 579 (Pa. 1822); People v. Olcott, 2
Johns. Cas. 301 (1801); M. FOSTER, A REPORT OF SOME PROCEEDINGS ON THE COMMISSION OF
OYER AND TERMINER AND GAOL DELIVERY FOR THE TRIAL OF THE REBELS IN THE YEAR 1746, at
32-33 (Oxford 1762) [hereinafter M. FOSTER] (all finding Coke's single citation not support-
ive of his statement).
26. "For otherwise many notorious murders and burglaries may pass unpunished by the
acquittal of a person probably guilty, where the full evidence is not searched out or given." 2
U HALE, HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN *243, *295. Justice Hale's treatise was some-
times cited in the eighteenth century as current authority for this oppressive practice, but
his point of view was anachronistic when the first edition of his HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF
THE CROWN appeared posthumously in the edition of Sollom Emlyn in 1736. Hale had to
have written this treatise before 1678, in the heyday of the jury discharge practice. 8 Dic-
TIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 902, 906 (Oxford 1917).
27. 90 Eng. Rep. 1122 (K.B. 1698).
28. Id. Justice Foster later raised serious doubts about the validity of this three sentence
opinion, which purported to announce "the opinion of all the Judges of England." 2 M.
FOSTER, supra note 25, at 37; see also Director of Public Prosecutions v. Nasralla, 2 All E.R.
161, 169 (1967) (reviewing the history of the jury discharge controversy in the eighteenth
century). Serjeant Hawkins also repudiated the abusive exceptions to the rule against jury
discharge, noting that the practice to the contrary in the reign of Charles H was an aberra-
tion. 2 W. HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN *622.
29. 18 St. Tr. 395, 1 Wils. K.B. 157, 95 Eng. Rep. 547 (1746) (reported and commented
upon at great length in 2 M. FOSTER, supra note 25, at 16-39).
1986]
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required.30
The Kinloch discretionary rule against jury discharge became riddled
with exceptions. Judges also slackened their observance of the related
rule, reiterated earlier by Chief Justice Holt, that the jurors must be kept
without "meat, drink, fire or candle 'till they all agree. '31 The law finally
settled somewhere between Coke's absolute rule and confusion. Black-
stone formulated the compromise position in a clause which has been
echoed ever since: the jury should not be discharged "unless in cases of
evident necessity.
'32
English law never deviated from the rule that only a final judgment of
acquittal or conviction based upon a jury verdict on the merits entered in
the record of the former trial would entitle the accused to a plea in bar.
The trial judge had absolute, unreviewable discretion to discharge the
jury in felony and misdemeanor cases without having to obtain the per-
mission of either the accused or the prosecutor.33 Throughout the contro-
versial history of the jury discharge rule and its exceptions, it remained
purely hortatory, and an unjustified discharge of the jury never barred
reprosecution.
34
C. Finality of Judgments
Few other rules were more entrenched in the common law than the rule
that a writ of error would lie only from a final judgment.3 5 The very na-
ture of proceedings in error required such a rule. The writ of error insti-
tuted a separate proceeding, not a continuation of the trial below, and the
plaintiff in error could only object to specific, prejudicial errors appearing
on the face of a completed record.36 Hence, a writ of error was available
30. 18 St. Tr. 395, 1 Wils. K.B., 95 Eng. Rep. 547.
31. Perkins, 90 Eng. Rep. 1122 (K.B. 1698).
32. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND "329, "360 J. PROFFAT, A
TREATISE ON TRIAL BY JURY §§ 478-79 (1877); see also the lengthy 1810 editorial note to
Trial of Thomas Whitebread, 7 St. Tr. 497 (1679) (condemning the oppressive jury dis-
charge practice in Whitebread, agreeing with Foster and Blackstone).
33. The Queen v. Winsor, 10 Cox C.C. 276 (1865) (felony); The Queen v. Charlesworth, 1
B. & S. 460, 121 Eng. Rep. 786 (1861) (misdemeanor).
34. M. FRIEDLAND, supra note 12, at 23 & nn. 2-5; J. PROFFAT, supra note 32, at §§ 475-82.
Even after the passage of the Criminal Appeals Act in 1907, which dramatically expanded
the rights of defendants to appellate review, the decision to discharge the jury remained a
matter within the absolute, unreviewable discretion of the trial court. M. FREEDLAND, supra
note 12, at 25.
35. The very words of the writ of error itself demonstrate that it was designed to permit
review of final judgments, "si judicium redditum sit." 3 M. BACON, A NEW ABRIDGEMENT OF
THE LAW *325 ("if a judgment has been returned").
36. 2 G. CROMPTON, THE PRACTICE OF THE COURTS OF KINGS BENCH AND COMMON PLEAS
*362-63; A. FrrzHERBERT, THE NEW NATURA BREVIUM 45F, *47.
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only from final judgments of courts of record. As the verdict of a jury
without the entry of a final judgment would not support a plea of au-
trefois acquit,3" a bare verdict would not entitle a party to a writ of er-
ror.39 Nothing short of an acquittal or conviction was considered a final
judgment in an English criminal trial; therefore, a writ of error for the
prosecution meant review of an acquittal based upon a verdict of not
guilty.
Many legal scholars assumed that acquittals could be reversed for er-
ror,4 0 and this is a step in their explanation of why an accused acquitted
on a defective indictment could be reindicted. These scholars postulated
that if an acquittal were so defective as to be subject to reversal upon a
hypothetical writ of error, then it would not be sufficient to bar rep-
rosecution.41 However, this logic skips what would be an essential formal
step in American procedure, appellate reversal of the defective judgment,
and seems to presume that a defective judgment is not simply voidable in
a higher court but is already void and can be overlooked by a lower court.
There is, therefore, a remarkable dearth of appellate cases in which ac-
quittals were actually reversed,42 leading to sharp disagreement among
modern scholars as to whether the crown could appeal judgments in favor
37. It seems that this rule was based on consideration for the competency of the trial
judge and judicial economy. The record could not be in two places at once, removing it
would interfere with the proceedings below and the error might be corrected before the trial
judge entered a final judgment. Crick, The Final Judgement as a Basis for Appeal, 41 YALE
L.J. 539, 541-43 (1932). Whether a ruling made below had been prejudicial to the plaintiff in
error could be determined only if the outcome of the whole trial, as embodied in the final
judgment, had been prejudicial to the plaintiff in error. Otherwise, a trial might be punc-
tuated with appeals by either party of every ruling.
38. 2 H. HALE, supra note 26, at *248 ("auterfoits convict or auterfoits acquit by verdict
... is no plea, unless judgement be given upon the conviction or acquittal"); 2 W. HAw-
KINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN *516.
39. Samuel v. Judin, 6 East R. 333, 102 Eng. Rep. 1314 (K.B. 1805); see also 4 W. BLACK-
STONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *384, "a judgement may be reversed, by
writ of error. which lies from all inferior criminal jurisdictions to the court of king's bench,
and from the king's bench to the house of peers, and may be brought for notorious mistakes
in the judgment or other parts of the record." Id.
40. J. CHrITY, A Practical Treatise on the Criminal Law *458-59 ("if a judgment in favor
of a prisoner be reversed, he may be arraigned and tried de novo"); 2. W. HAWKINS, supra
note 38, at *521; 2 M. HALE, supra note 26, at *247, *395; 2 W. STAUNDFORDE, supra note 11,
at *106.
41. E.g., 2 W. HAWKINS, supra note 26.
42. M. FRIEDLAND, supra note 12, at 287; see United States v. Sanges, 144 U.S. 310, 312
(1891) (surveying the major treatise writers and the handful of cases on point, unable to
decide whether acquittals could be reversed). But see J. BIsHoP, COMMzNTARmS ON THE
CRIMINAL LAW § 664 (Boston 1856) ("In England, writs of error, the practical object of which
is usually to bring the matter under the review of a higher tribunal, seem to be allowable to
the crown in criminal cases .. "); 3 F. WHARTON, A TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 3052 (6th ed. Philadephia 1868).
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of the defendant.4 3
The nature of the record in criminal cases, to which review upon writs
of error was restricted, was such that only alleged defects in the indict-
ment would be preserved. 4 Even if a higher court could reverse an ac-
quittal for error in the indictment, it could not convict the accused. A
new trial was required.4 5 But the prosecutor already had access to a new
trial without the need for a reversal. If the indictment was defective, the
accused could simply be reprosecuted even if the jury had actually acquit-
ted him on the merits." Upon reprosecution, the legitimacy of an alleged
former acquittal would be determined from the record produced to sup-
port a plea of autrefois acquit. Moreover, if in mid-course the trial had
taken a turn unfavorable to the prosecutor, he could enter a nolle
prosecui, which would never bar reprosecution. 47
Whatever the common law might really have been on the matter,
Blackstone confidently asserted that "there hath yet been no instance of
granting a new trial where the prisoner was acquitted upon the first.' '48
American courts interpreted this statement to mean that no appeal or
writ of error was available to the prosecution.4 9
43. See Arizona v. Manypenny, 451 U.S. 232, 245 n.20, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 850 (1981)
(collecting key articles).
44. See United States v. Jenkins, 490 F.2d 868, 871 (2d Cir. 1973), aff'd, 420 U.S. 358
(1974) (Friendly, J., discussing writs of error for the crown).
45. The Queen v. Houston, 4 Ir. L. Rep. 174, 2 Cra. & Dix 191 (1841); M. FRIEDLAND,
supra note 12, at 287-88 & n.4. Cf. The King v. Simpson, 2 Crim. App. 128, 130 (1909)
(construing the 1907 Criminal Appeals Act with respect to the possibility of an appellate
acquittal of the accused: "[the Act was] never meant to substitute another form of trial for
trial by jury."); MAGNA CARTA, cl. 39, (A. Howard ed. 1964).
46. Commonwealth v. Myers, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 188, 206 (1811) ("The writ of error is not
allowed to the crown, because an acquittal on an erroneous indictment is no bar to a future
prosecution."); Vaux's Case, 4 Co. Rep. 44a, 70 Eng. Rep. 992 (K.B. 1591); M. FRIEDLAND,
supra note 12, at 74 (the reason given for this harsh rule is that it would not always be
possible to determine from the record whether he had actually been acquitted on the merits
or for the defect).
47. M. FRIEDLAND, supra note 12, at 30-32. Hence, even if it were allowable, the writ of
error seems not to have been used by the Crown to obtain the reversal of acquittals. Instead,
there is some evidence that the Crown may have used the writ of error to obtain the reversal
of convictions which were deemed harsh. J. CHrrrY, supra note 40, at *748, *751-72. This
study does not address situations in which the prosecutor might wish to appeal a conviction
if the accused were convicted of a lesser included offense of the offense charged in the in-
dictment. Today, conviction of a lesser included offense is an implied acquittal of the
greater offense. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957) (conviction for second degree
murder implied acquittal of charge for first degree murder); R. BACIGAL, VIRGINIA CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE § 14-17 (1983).
48. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 39, at *361; see Sanges, 144 U.S. at 312 (citing numer-
ous "textbooks" in accord).
49. See generally 17 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 3310 (1919); 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law §
674 (1919); 2 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF PLEADING AND PRACTICE Appeals § 33 (1895) ("At common
law no writ of error could be sued out on behalf of the prosecution from a judgment of
636 [Vol. 20:629
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Three principles relevant to the development of American law emerge
from the English common law: (1) the plea of autrefois acquit protected
the accused against reprosecution where there had been a prior final judg-
ment of acquittal founded upon a jury verdict on the merits in a court of
valid jurisdiction pursuant to a valid indictment; (2) judges had unreview-
able discretion to determine if some "evident necessity" required the dis-
missal of a jury before verdict in a criminal trial; and (3) writs of error on
behalf of the prosecution were not a feature of the common law of
England.
II. FORMER JEOPARDY AND PROSECUTORIAL APPEALS IN AMERICAN LAW
A. The Jury Discharge/Double Jeopardy Rule
These English common law principles were the touchstones from which
American law on double jeopardy and prosecutorial appeals evolved.50 In
fact, the history of the fifth amendment indicates that the framers merely
constitutionalized the English double jeopardy concept,51 and so it was
interpreted by the early federal courts.5' Justice Washington's holding
that "jeopardy [meant] nothing short of the acquittal or conviction of the
prisoner, and the judgment of the court thereupon" 53 expressed the pre-
vailing American view.
In the first American case to deviate from common law precedent,
State v. Garriques,5 ' a "hung jury" was allowed to separate prior to giv-
ing verdict, resulting in a mistrial. The Attorney General moved to rep-
acquittal for the defendant in a criminal case.").
50. Sigler, supra note 13, at 298-308, describes the numerous early American constitu-
tional provisions, statutes, and court decisions dealing with the concept of double jeopardy,
demonstrating that throughout the early period of American history, the law adhered to the
res judicata concept in the English pleas of autrefois acquit and convict.
51. See United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 340-43 (1974); Green v. United States, 355
U.S. 184, 199-203 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); United States v. Jenkins, 490 F.2d
868, 873 (2d Cir. 1973); Sigler, supra note 13, at 304-07.
52. E.g., United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824); United States v. Haskell,
26 F. Cas. 207 (E.D. Pa. 1823) (no. 15,321); see also Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 33 (1978)
(discussing 3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONsTrrImoN (1833)); M. FRIEDLAND, supra
note 12, at 26-27 & n.7; 3 J. STORY, CoMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTrTUTION § 1781 (1833) (fifth
amendment constitutionalized the right to pleas of autrefois acquit and convict); F. WHAR-
TON, TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW OF THE UNIrD STATES 268, 270-72 (3d ed. Philadelphia
1855).
53. Haskell, 26 F. Cas. at 212. This classic view was not finally extinguished until the
Supreme Court applied a hybrid jury discharge/jeopardy rule to the states in 1969. Benton
v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969). As an example of the tenacity of the older rule, the Mis-
sissippi Constitution still reads: "there must be an actual acquittal or conviction on the
merits to bar another prosecution." Miss. CONST. art. III, § 22; see J. SIGLER, DOUBLE JEOP-
ARDY 33-34 (1969) (in 1969, seven states still did not bar reprosecution unless there had been
a prior acquittal).
54. 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) 188 (1795).
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rosecute the defendant, but the court barred reprosecution, citing Coke's
unqualified rule against pre-verdict jury discharge.55 The court did not
perceive the exhortations against jury discharge in English law as stating
a mere procedural guideline.56 The English cases and legal scholars had
only considered whether a trial judge should have the power to discharge
a jury under any circumstances. The dispute arose over a handful of un-
just mistrials during the Stuart period. However, over one hundred years
later, the Garriques court referred to the period of this "abhorrent" prac-
tice and announced that "[we] will not again put [defendant's] life in
jeopardy. '57
The common law persevered for a long time in many jurisdictions.
Early New York cases were frequently cited for their tenacious adherence
to the relatively simple common law concept of jeopardy. Most notable is
People v. Goodwin.5s Goodwin expressed a novel argument, based primar-
ily on the fifth amendment of the United States Constitution and a fanci-
ful reading of the word "jeopardy," maintaining that he had already been
in fear of "danger" or "jeopardy" to his "life or limb" in anticipating the
first jury's verdict before the jury was discharged for failure to agree. The
court, however, correctly noted that the fifth amendment did not apply to
the states, and even if it did, "the defendant, if sent to another jury, will
not be put twice in jeopardy, nor twice tried; for there never has been a
trial in which the merits of the case have been decided upon."59
The defense in Goodwin became the basis for revamping the whole con-
cept of double jeopardy. Goodwin's argument measured the defendant's
"jeopardy" not with a view to the legitimacy of proceedings, but by the
defendant's trepidation, which may be incited by any proceeding. Jeop-
ardy should have meant that the accused previously had been lawfully
acquitted or convicted. The normal criminal legal process recognized no
other outcome as final.
55. See supra note 24.
56. Kirk, "Jeopardy" During the Period of the Year Books, 82 U. PA. L. REv. 602, 603,
611-12 (1934); see also Crist, 437 U.S. at 46 (Powell, J., dissenting) ("[G]iven this rather
unreflective incorporation of a common-law rule of jury practice into the guarantee against
double jeopardy, it is not surprising that the state courts also generally fix the attachment of
jeopardy at the swearing of the jury.").
57. Garrigues, 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) at 189. The court reasoned that the inability of the jury
to agree was evidence of innocence. Cf. Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 509 (1978)
("The argument that a jury's inability to agree establishes reasonable doubt as to the de-
fendant's guilt, and therefore requires acquittal, has been uniformly rejected in this coun-
try."). It is ironic that the first case to employ the jury discharge/jeopardy rule did so on the
basis of reasoning which has been universally repudiated.
58. 18 Johns. 188 (1820).
59. Id. at 193-94 (emphasis in original). The case is notorious for its detailed historical
analysis of authorities on the right to discharge juries, autrefois acquit, and the meaning of
"jeopardy of life or limb."
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"Jeopardy," as English authors used the term in discussing the plea of
autrefois acquit, did not encompass the possibility of an abortive trial.
Recall that it was not finally settled before Blackstone's time that a trial
judge had the power to declare a mistrial and discharge the jury under
any circumstances, even on behalf of the accused. After judges began to
freely discharge juries, a defendant's trepidation experienced in an abor-
tive trial was never legally cognizable in support of the pleas of either
autrefois acquit or convict.
The policy behind the rule against premature discharge of a criminal
jury is compelling;60 however, not every good policy is the subject of a
constitutional right. The first step in the constitutional fortification of
this policy should have been a discussion of the defendant's right to an
uninterrupted trial before the first jury sworn to try him.6 1 Courts simply
assumed this right. Dissatisfied with leaving this right to the conscience
and discretion of trial judges,62 early American courts gradually incorpo-
rated the English jury discharge rule into the constitutional double jeop-
ardy concept, spawning a new breed of acquittal. If the defendant were in
"jeopardy" as soon as the jury was charged with his deliverance, then a
new trial at any time after this point would constitute a second jeopardy.
But this is an arbitrary measure of the commencement of jeopardy. From
the defendant's point of view, jeopardy commences much earlier in the
course of criminal proceedings.6"
The jury discharge rule transformed the double jeopardy clause. A rem-
edy for the unjustified dismissal of a jury would have no relevance before
a jury existed. Because trial preclusion was the sole remedy under the
60. [T]he State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated
attempts to convict an individual. . ., thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, ex-
pense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and
insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be
found guilty.
Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957).
61. Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689 (1949) ("defendant's valued right to have his trial
completed by a particular tribunal"). As Justice Powell pointed out, however, in his dissent
in Crist, 437 U.S. at 49, 53, no one has ever located a source for this right.
62. E.g., Commonwealth v. Clue, 3 Rawle *498, *501 ("A right which depends upon the
will of the magistrate is essentially no right at all.").
63. Jeopardy could be said to "attach" upon the beginning of testimony by the prosecu-
tor's first witness, as it does in a modern bench trial, Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377
(1975), or the swearing of the prosecutor's first witness, as was the rule in Montana before
Crist, 437 U.S. at 29 n.1, or upon the entry of a plea of "not guilty," Kirk, supra note 56, at
611-12, 617, or at the beginning of the voir dire process, Schulhofer, Jeopardy and Mistri-
als, 125 U. PA. L. Rav. 449, 512-14 (1977). Jeopardy could also attach upon arraignment,
which would have even greater ceremonial value than the swearing of the jury, marking the
commencement of formal proceedings by the state against the accused. If jeopardy were said
to attach at some point even earlier in pre-trial proceedings, the policies behind the double
jeopardy clause would be even better served: preservation of judicial resources and court
facilities, and prevention of harassment and embarrassment of the accused.
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double jeopardy concept, the law evolved that jeopardy, like hysteron
proteron, did not begin until the swearing of the jury. The concept of
previous acquittal on the merits paled before the force of the new doc-
trine, as the jeopardy clause changed from a principle akin to res judicata
into a trial-counting talisman which measured many "non-merits" termi-
nations as equivalent to acquittal by verdict. Apparently, the cost to soci-
ety in jeopardizing a final factual determination of innocence or guilt was
less than the potential cost to the accused of aggressive trial techniques."
The jury discharge rule and double jeopardy made strange bedfellows,
whose union generated complications unforeseen by their early match-
makers. One such complication was the introduction into the double jeop-
ardy doctrine of the "evident necessity" exception to the jury discharge
rule. The definition of these constitutionalized necessities became the
subject of many cases.6 5
Justice Washington noted, however, that if "jeopardy" was to relate to
the discharge of juries, the United States Constitution made no exception
for "necessity" '6 nor did the double jeopardy clauses in various state con-
stitutions contain such an exception. This creates a ridiculous situation.
How many other unqualified constitutional protections accorded criminal
defendants can the government breach simply on the basis of necessity?
Could the right to a trial by jury be dispensed with in cases of "evident
necessity?" Could the accused be forced to incriminate himself if the
judge ruled that his testimony was evidently necessary to prevent
injustice?
Commonwealth v. Cook6 7 led the jury discharge/jeopardy revolution. In
Cook, the court noted that "the provision that no person can be put twice
in jeopardy of life or limb, means something more than that he shall not
be twice tried for the same offence. . . . There is a wide difference be-
tween a verdict given and jeopardy of a verdict." ' The court was aston-
64. But see M. FRIEDLAND, supra note 12, at 222-23 ("To enter an acquittal in a case
where the accused is most probably guilty but has not had the matter properly adjudicated
upon by a jury does not adequately protect society, demoralizes law enforcement and tends
to turn the administration of justice into a game.").
65. See, e.g., Annotation, Separation of Jury in Criminal Case, 79 A.L.R. 821 (1932);
Annotation, Plea of Double Jeopardy Where Jury was Discharged Because of Inability of
the Prosecution to Present Testimony, 74 A.L.R. 803 (1931); Annotation, Illness or Death
of Member of Juror's Family as Justification for Declaring Mistrial and Discharging Jury
in Criminal Case, 53 A.L.R. 1062 (1928); Annotation, Plea of Former Jeopardy Where Jury
Discharged Because of Misconduct or Disqualification of one or More of their Number, 38
A.L.R. 706 (1925); Annotation, Separation of Jury in Criminal Case, 34 A.L.R. 1115 (1925).
66. Haskell, 26 F. Cas. at 212 ("[T]he exception of necessity is not to be found in any
part of the constitution; and I should consider this court as stepping beyond its duty in
interpolating it into that instrument.").
67. 6 Serg. & Rawle *577.
68. Id. at *598.
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ished that "the jury was discharged solely on their declaration, that they
could not agree, and that there was not the least probability they ever
would," and concluded "this discharge amounted to an acquittal." 9
During the nineteenth century, the Cook doctrine spread throughout
the states, while a few states continued to adhere to the common law.
7 0
By 1900, a majority of the states had adopted the jury discharge/jeopardy
rule.71 Moreover, by the early twentieth century, double jeopardy rules,
exceptions, and exceptions to exceptions had grown to extravagant pro-
portion 712-a far cry from the original simplicity of "acquittal on the mer-
its bars reprosecution."
The federal courts, however, were relatively slow in adopting the new
standard. The first case clearly advocating the change, Kepner v. United
States," evoked a stinging dissent from Justice Holmes,74 who focused
not on how many times the defendant might be tried, but on whether a
final judgment on the merits had been reached. Holmes' view, however,
was not destined to prevail. In 1963, the Supreme Court barred rep-
rosecution after a mistrial by explicitly adopting what numerous cases
had suggested since Kepner: jeopardy attached upon the swearing of the
jury."5 In 1969, the jury discharge/jeopardy rule was applied to the states
in Benton v. Maryland7 and Crist v. Bretz, 7 dictating that the states
69. Id. Like Garrigues, this case, which first sets out the jury discharge/jeopardy doctrine
at length, is founded upon facts which today would unquestionably not bar reprosecution.
See supra note 57; J. BISHOP, supra note 42, §§ 659, 668 (noting that as early as 1856, the
majority view among the states allowed reprosecution after the discharge of a "hung jury").
70. Crist, 437 U.S. at 45 n.10 (Powell, J., dissenting) (listing cases on both sides); see also
J. PROFFAT, supra note 32, at 537-45 (focusing on "necessity" justifying discharge); R.
MOSCHzisKER, Trial by Jury 119-23 (1922) (focusing on Pennsylvania progeny of Cook); F.
WHARTON, supra note 52, at 263-73 (jury discharge/jeopardy rule adopted in Pennsylvania,
North Carolina, Tennessee, Alabama, Virginia (dictum); common-law rule defended in fed-
eral courts, Massachusetts, New York, Illinois, Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri, and advo-
cated by most treatise writers).
71. 17 AmRIcAN AND ENGLISH ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF LAW, Jeopardy, at 584-85 (2d ed. 1900).
Six states and the federal courts are listed as adhering to the common-law rule, by this time
considered an unusual exception. Id. at 585 n.1.
72. See 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law §§ 363-432, at 236-59 (1919).
73. 195 U.S. 100 (1904).
74. Id. at 134 (Holmes, White and McKenna, JJ., dissenting):
At the present time in this country there is more danger that criminals will escape
justice than that they will be subjected to tyranny .... [L]ogically and rationally a
man cannot be said to be more than once in jeopardy in the same cause, however
often he may be tried. The jeopardy is one continuing jeopardy from its beginning to
the end of the cause.
Id.
75. Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963). The Court had endorsed the rule in
Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684 (1949), but found that military exigencies justified the disrup-
tion of the trial.
76. 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
77. 437 U.S. 28 (1978).
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must count the swearing of the jury as the attachment point for jeop-
ardy.7 1 At this point, national double jeopardy doctrine insisted, ahistori-
cally, that the double jeopardy clause was intended to limit to one the
number of times an accused could be put upon his defense. This extreme
view makes the Constitution count not judgments, nor even juries, but
the defense attorney's trips to the courthouse.7 9
B. Prosecutorial Appeals
American courts generally denied writs of error to the prosecution un-
less specifically authorized by statute or a constitutional provision. 0 This
general prohibition was the basis for the Supreme Court's first holding on
the issue of appeals by the government in United States v. Sanges.15 A
presumption against the validity of all appeals by the prosecution was not
necessitated by the concept of double jeopardy because only an appeal
which sought reprosecution after an acquittal (whether on the merits by
jury verdict or by operation of law after an unjustified jury discharge)
implicated the guarantee against a second jeopardy.
The English common law rule that only final judgments are subject to
review in actions at law (including criminal proceedings) has always been
78. Id. at 38.
79. The classic articulation of the one shot prosecution theory of double jeopardy may be
found in United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358, 368-70 (1974) (dismissal of indictment,
whether on the merits or not, bars reprosecution), overruled by United States v. Scott, 437
U.S. 82, 97 (1978) (double jeopardy does not bar reprosecution unless dismissal of the in-
dictment was based on a merits determination against the prosecution of at least one ele-
ment of the offense charged). See The Constitution of the United States of America, S.
Doc. No. 39, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 947 (1964) ("By the common law not only was a second
punishment for the same offense prohibited, but a second trial was forbidden whether or not
the accused had suffered punishment or had been acquitted or convicted."). The validity of
this statement should be tested against statements by Coke, supra notes 15-17; Hale, supra
note 26; Hawkins, supra notes 28 & 38; Blackstone, supra notes 32 & 39; and the court in
Charlesworth, 1 B. & S. 460, 121 Eng. Prep. 786 (K.B. 1861), all indicating that the common
law did not count trials, but counted judgments. Suggestions that the guarantee against
double jeopardy was a matter of counting any terminated criminal proceedings as conclusive
pre-existed the Supreme Court's fancy for such a rule. See J. BISHOP, supra note 42, at §§
664, 665. In Commonwealth v. Perrow, 124 Va. 805, 97 S.E. 820 (1919), the Virginia Su-
preme Court of Appeals had inflated the "spirit" of the double jeopardy immunity to in-
clude a pre-attachment dismissal on purely legal grounds as a former jeopardy, holding that
the commonwealth's right to appeal and obtain a reversal had therefore been extinguished
proprio vigore.
80. See, e.g., United States v. Sanges, 144 U.S. 310, 312-18 (1892) (reviewing prior deci-
sions in state courts); Commonwealth v. Cummings, 57 Mass. (3 Cush.) 212 (1849) (constru-
ing REv. STAT., ch. 54, p. 227 (1842) against the state, the statute provided for appeals but
did not specify to which party they would lie). See generally 17 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 3310
(1919).
81. 144 U.S. 310 (1892); see also United States v. Jenkins, 490 F.2d 868, 874 (2d Cir.
1973) (Friendly, J.) (construing Sanges, 144 U.S. at 310).
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firmly established in American law."2 Early American courts generally
recognized only two kinds of final judgments in criminal cases: conviction
with a sentence set forth on the record;8 3 and acquittal based upon a jury
verdict, or later, by operation of law for the unwarranted discharge of the
jury.84 Because only final judgments were reviewable and only an acquit-
tal was considered a final judgment adverse to the prosecution, the con-
cept of prosecutorial appeals strongly suggested attempts to reverse ac-
82. Until the late nineteenth century, the rule applied equally to cases in equity in the
federal courts. McLish v. Roff, 141 U.S. 661, 665-67 (1891); Forgay v. Conrad, 47 U.S. (6
How.) 201, 205 (1848); Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §§ 21, 22, 25, 1 Stat. 73, 83, 84, 85
(current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982)). It was not until 1891 that the federal govern-
ment began to allow interlocutory appeals of injunctions. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517, §§ 6,
7, 26 Stat. 828 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1292a (Supp. 1985)).
In Virginia, the rule that only final judgments are appealable has been rigorously enforced
in criminal cases. See, e.g., Fuller v. Commonwealth, 189 Va. 327, 330, 53 S.E.2d 26, 28
(1949); Sturgill v. Commonwealth, 175 Va. 584, 7 S.E.2d 141 (1940) (where statute granting
right of appeal is silent, final judgment as prerequisite is presumed); Read v. Common-
wealth, 90 Va. 168, 169, 17 S.E. 855, 855 (1893) (as the measure of finality required for
appealability of a conviction, "[tihe record must affirmatively show the sentence itself").
But see Abney v. United States , 431 U.S. 651, 657-62 (1977); United States v. Lansdowne,
460 F.2d 164 (4th Cir. 1972) (allowing interlocutory appeal of denial of plea of former jeop-
ardy under the federal collateral order exception created by Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan
Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949)). On the application of the Cohen doctrine to interlocutory ap-
peals by criminal defendants, see Special Project, Criminal Procedure, 71 GEo. L.J. 339, 730-
37 (1982). The policy against interlocutory appeals by the government in criminal cases has
been stronger because piecemeal litigation and delays in the trial might implicate the sixth
amendment right to a speedy trial. See, e.g., DiBella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121 (1962).
The Criminal Appeals Act of 1971, however, allowed the federal government to appeal po-
tentially outcome determinative interlocutory orders for return of seized property and sup-
pression of evidence. 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1985).
83. See, e.g., Read v. Commonwealth, 90 Va. 168, 17 S.E. 855 (1893); 17 C.J.S. Criminal
Law § 3293 (1919) ("Ordinarily, final judgment in a criminal case is the sentence of the
court.").
84. At common-law, the trial judge also had power to direct a verdict of acquittal for
insufficiency of evidence. J. CHrrry, supra note 40, at 458. The opposite view was maintained
until relatively late in Virginia. See, e.g., Montgomery v. Commonwealth, 98 Va. 852, 37 S.E.
1 (1900). A similar rule applied to the appellate court in Virginia, and the only appellate
remedy available to the accused was a new trial. See 5B MICHIE's Jup. Criminal Procedure §
69, at 337 nn.5-7 (1983) (noting that Virginia courts are now authorized to enter acquittals);
R. BACIGAL, supra note 47, §§ 21-2, -3, at 259-60 (1983) (discussing Va. Rule of Court
3A:22(c): "If the trial court sets aside the verdict because of insufficiency of the evidence,
the court must enter a judgment of acquittal. If the court sets aside the verdict because of
error committed during trial, the appropriate remedy is to grant a new trial."). The power of
courts to direct verdicts of acquittal was fairly well established by the early twentieth cen-
tury. Annotation, Power and Duty of Court to Direct or Advise Acquittal in Criminal Case
for Insufficiency of Evidence, 17 A.L.R. 910 (1922). The current trend is to abandon the
artificiality of directing verdicts of acquittal, and authorize the trial judge to enter acquittals
for insufficiency of evidence even after a jury verdict of guilty. FED. R. tmA. P. 29(c); 23A
C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1145(1) (1961 & Supp. 1984); 5B MICHm'S JUn. Criminal Procedure §
369, at 377 (1983). Acquittal at the instance of the court for insufficiency of evidence, in the
jurisdictions which allow such an acquittal, will be treated as any other acquittal for the
purposes of this study. See infra note 123.
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quittals 5 This conceptual basis for the early American prejudice against
prosecutorial appeals was exacerbated by the fact that several jurisdic-
tions had actually reversed acquittals and ordered new trials.86 The pros-
pect of appellate courts reversing acquittals stimulated a great deal of
protesting literature and case dicta.
8 7
The jury discharge/jeopardy rule created doubts whether the accused
could ever be retried after the swearing of a jury, even pursuant to his
own motion for a new trial.88 Most state constitutional double jeopardy
clauses simply read that no person could be placed twice in jeopardy for
the same offense. If jeopardy commenced upon the swearing of the jury,
the clause literally meant that a second jury could not be sworn. Courts
resolved this problem by holding that because the double jeopardy clause
was designed to protect the accused, he should be able to waive that pro-
tection and request a new trial.8 " However, some scholars adhered to the
"continuing jeopardy theory," which dictated that the accused's jeopardy
would continue uninterrupted through a new trial until a judgment was
reached.90
No matter which theory was cited, if the accused had moved for and
85. See generally 2 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF PLEADING AND PRACTCE Appeals § 33 (a), (b), at
146 (1895).
86. See, e.g., People v. Corning, 2 N.Y. (2 Comstock) 9, reprinted in 49 Am. Dec. 364
(1848) (reviewing and overruling prior New York cases in which acquittals were reversed);
17 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 3318 (1919). Connecticut and Kentucky permitted appeals of mis-
demeanors; Virginia permitted appeals of revenue cases, and in general, reversal of an ac-
quittal was permissible if not barred by the state constitution.
87. E.g., J. BISHOP, supra note 42, § 658, at 544 n.4 ("a verdict of acquittal ... can never
... be set aside and a new trial granted"); Editorial note following State v. Solomons, -
Tenn. (6 Yer.) 360 (1834), reprinted in 27 Am. Dec. 471 (1881) (an acquittal in any case, no
matter how erroneous, should be absolute). An acquittal, no matter how erroneous, still may
not be reversed or appealed. Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 64, 69, 75, 78 (1977)
(acquittal held absolute, even though "[t]he trial court's rulings here led to an erroneous
resolution in the defendant's favor on the merits of the charge"); Fong Foo v. United States,
369 U.S. 141, 143 (1962) (acquittal is absolute, even if "based upon an egregiously erroneous
foundation").
88. See, e.g., United States v. Gibert, 25 F. Cas. 1287 (C.C. Mass. 1834) (No. 15, 204).
This was the same question raised by the English rule of jury practice, and resolved by
Justice Foster a century before in The King v. Kinloch, 18 St. Tr. 395, 1 Wils. K.B. 157, 95
Eng. Rep. 547 (1746).
89. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 203-04 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (col-
lecting early cases); see M. Kohler, Methods of Review in Criminal Cases in the United
States, reprinted in THE NECEsSrrY FOR CRIMINAL APPEAL 505-06 (J. Levy ed. 1899) ("[T]his
view was adopted in every jurisdiction in the country prior to the middle of the [nineteenth]
century."); cf. Trono v. United States, 199 U.S. 521, 533 (1905) (when the accused has ap-
pealed, reversal of his conviction "opens up the whole controversy and acts upon the origi-
nal judgment as if it had never been").
90. State v. Lee, 65 Conn. 265, 273, 30 A. 1110, 1111 (1894) ("putting in jeopardy means a
jeopardy which is real and has continued through every stage of one prosecution ... [and]
while such prosecution remains undetermined the one jeopardy has not been exhausted").
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been granted a new trial or had otherwise consented to a discharge of the
jury, reprosecution would not be barred by the interruption of the first
trial."' Double jeopardy theory would not prevent a prosecutorial appeal
of an order prematurely ending a proceeding at the defendant's request.
Although such an order was not an appealable final judgment at common
law, an overriding statute could remove this obstacle.
A defective indictment could also be assailed by a post-verdict motion
in arrest of judgment.9 2 Whether the defendant took this action before or
during trial or after verdict, judgment might be arrested, leaving no for-
mer jeopardy to bar a new trial nor a final judgment upon which an ap-
peal might be based. 3 A statute, however, could render orders in arrest of
judgment appealable by the prosecutor. Similarly, an appellate court
could reverse a judgment of conviction pursuant to the defendant's writ
of error, but until modern times could not grant an acquittal.94 The rever-
sal of a conviction in an appellate court was comparable to an order in
arrest of judgment in the trial court. Because the accused could be retried
after securing an appellate reversal of a conviction,95 a statute would not
offend double jeopardy doctrine by allowing the prosecutor to appeal to a
higher appellate court.9 6
91. United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896); F. WHARTON, supra note 42, § 591, at 387.
92. United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 348-49 (1975); United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S.
267, 280-82 (1970); M. FRIEDLAND, supra note 12, at 275. In later American law, other preju-
dicial errors which might not appear in the indictment, but would still appear on the face of
the record, could be attacked by a motion in arrest of judgment. F. WHARTON, supra note 52,
at 975; see also Annotation, Appealability of Order Arresting Judgment in Criminal Case,
98 A.L.R.2d 737, 738 (1964); 5B MIcHIE'S JUR. Criminal Procedure § 69, at 328 (Repl. Vol.
1983): "A motion in arrest of judgment lies in the trial court only for material error appar-
ent on the fact [sic] [read "face"], of the record, such as lack of jurisdiction, or a substantial
defect in the indictment."
93. M. FRIEDLAND. supra note 12, at 65 ("Whatever form of attack was pursued by the
accused, whether it was by demurrer, motion to quash, motion in arrest of judgment...
the accused could be recharged because there was no judgment."); see F. WHARTON, supra
note 42, § 551, at 351-52; see also 17 AMERICAN AND ENGLISH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW, Jeop-
ardy 588 (1900) (defective indictment "will not support a valid judgment").
94. See The King v. Simpson, 2 Cr. App. Rep. 128, 130 (1909). The writ of error was the
sole remedy for errors in criminal proceedings and only questions of law appearing on the
face of the record were reviewable. The court in proceedings in error was unable to review
questions of fact or mixed questions of law and fact. 7 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF PLEADING AND
PRACTICE Error, Writ of, at 847-50 (1898).
95. See supra note 89; see also 3 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 32 (reversal for error nulli-
fies jeopardy).
96. Even a strict procedure-counting point of view would not be offended by appeals of
either an order in arrest of judgment upon a verdict of guilty, or the reversal of a conviction
by an intermediate appellate court because, in both instances, the court entertaining the
appeal need not order a new trial. A court ruling favorably on a prosecutorial appeal from
an order arresting judgment may simply reinstate the guilty verdict and order that judg-
ment be entered. See United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332 (1975) (appeal of post-verdict
order dismissing indictment for delay). Likewise, a court of last resort could reverse an in-
termediate appellate court's reversal and reinstate a trial court's judgment of conviction.
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A defective indictment was held to vitiate any judgment delivered upon
it, whether before or after the swearing of a jury.9 Even if a state had
adopted the jury discharge rule, the dismissal of an indictment before the
swearing of a jury would not bar a new trial because the defendant had
never been in jeopardy.9 8 Pre-trial dismissal of an indictment was not
considered a final judgment for purposes of appeal; however,
prosecutorial appeals of such a dismissal could be allowed by statute.9
Statutes authorizing appeals of dismissals of defective indictments began
to appear during the nineteenth century.100 Such appeals were allowed by
the first Federal Criminal Appeals Act in 1907,101 and the federal govern-
ment's right to such appeals today is preserved by statute.10 2
Today, appeals per se are not barred by the jury discharge/jeopardy
rule after any type of trial termination, including an acquittal on the mer-
its.103 The doctrine of former jeopardy protects against successive tri-
als-not appeals. Hence, after an acquittal on the merits, the prosecutor
can take a "moot" appeal.104 Such appeals can be undertaken to review
questions of law without affecting the acquitted defendant. 0 5 The prose-
cutor can also appeal to test the "evident necessity" of an allegedly unjus-
See, e.g., Village of Shelby v. Boenau, 40 Ohio St. 253 (1883). Today, this type of
prosecutorial appeal is preserved statutorily in Ohio. See generally 17 C.J.S. Criminal Law §
3322, at 47 (1919).
97. Souther v. Commonwealth, 48 Va. (7 Gratt.) 673 (1851) (quashing of former indict-
ment does not bar reprosecution); Vaux's Case, 4 Co. Rep. 44a, 76 Eng. Rep. 992 (1591); J.
BISHOP, supra note 42, § 663, at 548; IF. WHARTON, supra note 42, § 551, at 351. Vaux was
partially repudiated in 1848 in Virginia (acquittal on the merits would bar reprosecution,
notwithstanding defects in the indictment). See infra note 136. The United States Supreme
Court finally rejected Vaux's concept of the "tainted acquittal" in United States v. Ball, 163
U.S. 662 (1896).
98. See Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 389 (1975) (before jeopardy attaches the
trial court is "without power to make any determination regarding petitioner's guilt or inno-
cence"); Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28 (1978) (jeopardy attaches upon the swearing of the jury).
99. Such appellate rights became very common by the early twentieth century. See, e.g.,
Prosecuting Attorney v. Judge of Recorder's Court, 59 Mich. 529, 541, 26 N.W. 694, 695
(1886) ("It is very well settled that a decision quashing an indictment may be reviewed.").
Annotation, Right of Prosecution to Review of Decision Quashing or Dismissing Indictment
or Information, or Sustaining Demurrer Thereto, 92 A.L.R. 1137 (1934).
100. See, e.g., Editorial note following State v. Solomons, __ Tenn. (6 Yer.) 360 (1834),
reprinted in 27 Am. Dec. 469, 478-79 (1881). M. Kohler, supra note 89, at 512-13 (discussion
of the New York statute of 1852).
101. 34 Stat. 1246 (1907).
102. 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1976); see also Annotation, Dismissal of Indictment or Information
as Reviewable on Appeal by United States under 18 USCS § 3731, as Amended by Omni-
bus Crime Control Act of 1970, 30 A.L.R. FED. 655 (1976).
103. United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 342 (1975).
104. California, Kansas, Maryland, Oregon and Texas had statutes allowing "moot" ap-
peals, i.e., review of legal questions in a case without affecting the defendant. See Editorial
note, supra note 100.
105. See infra note 156 and accompanying text (discussing the possibility of allowing
moot appeals in Virginia).
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tified premature dismissal of a jury. Various state statutes also may pro-
vide for appeals from any non-terminal interlocutory ruling. Such rulings
include orders suppressing evidence or confessions, returning seized prop-
erty, or reducing the charge in an indictment to a lesser included offense.
The area of intersection between the jury discharge/jeopardy rule and
prosecutorial appeals is narrow indeed. For the most part, the two issues
are unrelated.
In the early nineteenth century, the number of states having adopted
the new jury discharge/jeopardy rule and the number allowing appeals
were five and six respectively.106 By 1918, thirty states and the District of
Columbia had adopted the jury discharge/jeopardy rule; 07 thirty-two
states and the District of Columbia had allowed appeals by the prosecu-
tion, twenty-nine by statute, and four by court decision. 08 By 1985, the
new jeopardy rule applied to all of the states, the federal government, and
the District of Columbia. All of these jurisdictions, with the exception of
New Hampshire, now also have the right to some form of appellate review
in criminal cases. 09 This seemingly parallel development might be an ac-
cident of history. There is little evidence that the spread of the jury dis-
charge/jeopardy rule stimulated legislatures to provide for prosecutorial
106. J. BISHOP, supra note 42, § 664, at 549 n.6 (appeals) and § 659, at 546 n.2 (new
jeopardy rule); F. WHARTON, supra note 42, § 3050, at 496 (appeals) and § 575, at 372 (new
jeopardy rule).
107. 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 363, at 236-37 & n.25 (1919).
108. 17 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 3310, at 39-40 & n.19, § 3313, at 41-42 & nn.39, 43 (1919).
109. 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1983); ALA. CODE §§ 12-12-10, 12-22-91 (1975); ALASKA STAT. §§
12.55.120, 22.10.020(a), 22.15.240 (1982); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-4031 to -4032 (Supp.
1984); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 43-2720 to -2722, -2733 (1977); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1235, 1238
(West 1982); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-12-102 (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-96 (Supp. 1983);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 9902-9903 (1974); D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-104 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 924.02, -.071, -.07 (1982 & Supp. 1983); GA. CODE ANN. § 5-7-1 to -7-2 (Supp. 1984);
HAWAII REV. STAT. § 641-13 (Supp. 1983); IDAHO CODE § 19-2801 (1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
110(A), §§ 315(a), 604(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-4-2 (Burns
Supp. 1984); IOWA CODE § 814.5 (1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-3602 to -3603 (1981); Ky. REV.
STAT. § 22A .020(4) (1980); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 911-912 (West 1984); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2115-A (1980); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 12-301, -401 (1984);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 278, § 28E (1981); MICH. CoP. LAWS ANN. § 770.12 (West 1982);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244.11 (West Supp. 1984); Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-35-103 (1972); Mo. REV.
STAT. § 547.210 (1978); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-20-103 (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-2316, -
2319 (1979); NEV. REV. STAT. § 177.085 (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 490:4 (1983); N.J. R.
ApP. PROC. 2.3-1; N.J. R. CRIM. PRAC. 3:24; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 39-3-3 (1978); N.Y. CRIM. PROC.
LAW §§ 450.20, -.30, -.40, -.50, -.80 (Consol. 1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-979, -1432, -1445, -
1446 (1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-28-07 (Supp. 1983); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.14 (Page
1982); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 1053, 1053.1 (West Supp. 1984); OR. REV. STAT. §§
138.020, -.060 (1983); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 9712(d), 9713(e), 9714(e), 9715(d), 9781
(Purdon 1982); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-24-32 (Supp. 1984); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 23A-32-4
to -32-5 (1979); TENN. R. APP. PROC. 3(c), 9, 10, 11; TEx. CODE CRim. PROC. ANN. art. 44.01
(Vernon Supp. 1985); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35-26 (Supp. 1983); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §
7403 (Supp. 1984); WASH. R APP. PROC. 2.2(b), 2.3; W. VA. CODE § 58-5-30 (1966); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 974.05 (West 1985); Wyo. STAT. §§ 7-12-102 to -103 (Supp. 1984).
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appeals. The spread of such appeals seems primarily to have been the
result of another legal development-the growth of the concept that any
ruling or judgment which ends a proceeding in favor of the accused must
be reversed in an appellate court before he can be reprosecuted, even if
double jeopardy is not at issue.110
Today, all statutes authorizing prosecutorial appeals must observe the
constraints imposed by the federal double jeopardy clause, as interpreted
by the Supreme Court. One author has aptly summarized these limita-
tions in a single sentence: "The prosecution may appeal (without fear of
triggering the double jeopardy prohibition) any decision before jeopardy
attaches, as well as any post-attachment decision that does not go to the
merits."' Legal discourse on double jeopardy and prosecutorial appeals
has otherwise become a morass of confused, equivocal verbiage, balancing
tests, and interest analyses.
2
C. Overview
The current black letter law may be summarized under five headings
which correspond to five potential interfaces between the doctrine of
double jeopardy and the subject of prosecutorial appeals:
(1) Acquittal. Acquittal on the merits by jury verdict, or order of the
court in a bench or jury trial, is absolute, notwithstanding any errors in
the trial.1"3
(2) Conviction. Conviction bars reprosecution." 4 If, however, a convic-
tion is set aside by the trial court or reversed on appeal, reprosecution
will not be barred. 15 If the reversal was based' upon the insufficiency of
110. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.08(2) (A.L.I. Official Draft 1962).
111. C. WHITEBREAD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 24.06, at 612 (1980).
112. Westen and Drubel, Toward A General Theory of Double Jeopardy, 1978 Sup. CT.
REV. 82 n.6.
113. See United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571 (1977) (defining
acquittal as "a resolution, correct or not, of some or all of the factual elements of the offense
charged"). There are now four types of conclusive acquittals: 1) by verdict in a jury trial; 2)
by the judge in a bench trial; 3) entry of acquittal by the judge for insufficiency of the
evidence in a jury trial. See supra note 84. A judge's power to acquit in a jury trial can be
modified by statute. Martin Linen, 430 U.S. at 567 (affirming the power of acquittal granted
by FED. R. CRiM. P. 29(c)). But cf. State v. Brunn, 22 Wash. 2d 120, 154 P.2d 826 (1945)
(statute granting the .state power to appeal a judge acquittal in a jury trial abolished the
finality of such an acquittal); 4) the reversal of a conviction by an appellate court for insuffi-
ciency of the evidence. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 18 (1978). Conviction or acquittal
of a greater offense is an implied acquittal of lesser included offenses, and conviction or
acquittal of a lesser included offense is usually an implied acquittal of the greater offense.
See, e.g., Martin v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 720, 273 S.E.2d 778 (1981).
114. Multiple punishments stemming from a single conviction are also prohibited. Ex
Parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873).
115. Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 40 (1982); United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 465
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the evidence, then the reversal will operate as an acquittal. 116 If the rever-
sal was based merely upon the weight of the evidence, it will not operate
as an acquittal.' 1 7
(3) Dismissals. If the prosecution is dismissed for any reason before
the attachment of jeopardy," 8 reprosecution will not be barred." 9 If the
prosecution is dismissed after the attachment of jeopardy, reprosecution
will be barred only if the dismissal was based on a factual resolution
against the prosecution of at least one element of the offense.
20
(4) Mistrial-Discharge of the Jury. The defendant may be rep-
rosecuted if he consents to a mistrial declared because of defense miscon-
duct, or granted pursuant to a defense motion,' 2' unless the government
(1964); United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896). The Court has returned to the view held
in Ball and Tateo (that the accused may be retried after he procures a reversal), after a
brief period during which the Court held that reprosecution would be barred. See United
States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332 (1974). The jeopardy yardstick used by the Court during the
Wilson period was described in United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358 (1974). After the
accused obtained a reversal of his conviction, double jeopardy would bar "further proceed-
ings . . . devoted to the resolution of factual issues going to the elements of the offense
charged. ... Id. at 370. Even under the Wilson one-shot prosecution standard, however,
appeals were not barred if the appellate court could simply reinstate a former guilty verdict,
or a former conviction. See supra note 96. This standard produced cases such as Finch v.
United States, 433 U.S. 676 (1977) (per curiam), in which the Court held that because there
was no guilty verdict to reinstate upon reversal, the government could not appeal a non-
merits post-jeopardy dismissal even though the parties had submitted an agreed stipulation
of facts to the trial court for the resolution of legal issues. The Court's retreat from this
bright line distinction set forth in Wilson and Jenkins has been reaffirmed in Justices of
Boston Municipal Court v. Lydon, 466 U.S. 294, 308 (1984) ("The general rule is that the
Clause does not bar reprosecution of a defendant whose conviction is overturned on
appeal.").
116. Burks, 437 U.S. at 1. The standard for "insufficiency" is that "the government's case
was so lacking that it should not have even been submitted to the jury." Id. at 16 (emphasis
in original).
117. Tibbs, 457 U.S. at 40 (in such a case the appellate court merely sits as a "thirteenth
juror" and disagrees with the conviction).
118. Crist, 437 U.S. at 28 (swearing of the jury); Serfass, 420 U.S. at 377 (first presenta-
tion of evidence in a bench trial).
119. Serfass, 420 U.S. at 393 ("[Ain accused must suffer jeopardy before he can suffer
double jeopardy."). The Court in Serfass held emphatically that a pre-jeopardy dismissal,
even if based on a defense going to the merits of the case, would not bar reprosecution. Id.
at 394. But cf. Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 326 (1984). "[T]he Government,
like the defendant, is entitled to resolution of the case by verdict from the jury .... " Id.
120. United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978) (applying the Martin Linen acquittal stan-
dard to post-jeopardy dismissals). Hence, a trial terminated after the "attachment" of jeop-
ardy for defects in the indictment or information has been held not to bar reprosecution.
See Lee v. United States, 432 U.S. 23 (1977) (dismissal at close of evidence pursuant to
defendant's motion); Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973) (dismissal before presenta-
tion of evidence pursuant to prosecutor's motion).
121. See Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 672-76 (1982); United States v. Dinitz, 424
U.S. 600, 606-08 (1976).
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acted deliberately to" 'goad' the defendant into moving for a mistrial.""12
The court can declare a mistrial sua sponte or the prosecutor may move
for a mistrial. In either case, if the defendant objects there must be
"manifest necessity" to justify the mistrial, or it will preclude
reprosecution.'2"
(5) Sentences. Sentences which are below a statutory minimum, or
otherwise unlawful, or even too lenient, may be appealed.'24
122. Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 676. The standard to be applied is that the prosecutorial mis-
conduct must manifest "intent on the part of the prosecutor to subvert the protections af-
forded by the Double Jeopardy Clause." Id. Although such a case has not been decided
squarely by the Supreme Court, it is very clear that judicial misconduct designed to avoid
an acquittal by provoking the accused to move for a mistrial would also bar reprosecution.
See United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 485 n.12 (1970).
123. Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 505-06 (1970); United States v. Perez, 22 U.S.
(9 Wheat) 579, 580 (1824). What constitutes "manifest necessity" can not be stated with any
exactitude, but the Court seems most interested in applying the exculpatory jury discharge
rule to cases involving governmental bad faith, rather than negligence. See C. WHITEBREAD,
supra note 111, § 24.03, at 489-92. Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 675, supports this conclusion, in
that the Court now requires a showing of "intent" on-the part of the prosecutor to circum-
vent the accused's constitutional rights against a second jeopardy before reprosecution will
be barred. In Lydon, 466 U.S. 294, the Court rejected respondent's double jeopardy claim on
the grounds that the operation of the Massachusetts dual court system did not constitute
"governmental oppression of the sort against which the Double Jeopardy Clause was in-
tended to protect." Id. at 1814 (quoting United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 91 (1978)). The
conclusion that the Court is retreating from a mechanical application of the jury discharge/
jeopardy rule to an application aimed more directly at bad faith conduct is supported by
analogy to the recent "good faith exception" to the exclusionary rule. The Court has moved
to restore that judicially created technical rule, which also tends to exculpate without adju-
dication of the merits, to the context of intentional governmental oppression. Massachusetts
v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984) (search upheld as in good faith, although warrant was
technically defective); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (search upheld as in good
faith, although probable cause was lacking). United States v. Martinez, 667 F.2d 886 (10th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1008 (1982), is a perfect example of the jury discharge rule
operating within its proper scope. Martinez was indicted for possession and mailing of unre-
gistered explosives. On the evening of the third day of trial, the judge held a secret meeting
in his hotel room with the prosecutors, court personnel, and several government witnesses.
The judge was concerned about subtle intimidation of the jury by spectator friends of the
defendant. He planned to install hidden cameras to record the intimidating gestures and
demeanor of the spectators and defense attorneys during the pending presentation of the
defense's case. The judge then planned to declare a mistrial by having an officer blurt out
testimony previously held inadmissible, thus ensuring that the defendant would either move
for a mistrial, or join the judge's sua sponte declaration of a mistrial, avoiding a possible
appellate inquiry into "manifest necessity." After this plot materialized, the defendant ap-
pealed and the circuit court barred reprosecution.
124. United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117 (1980). Two rationales explain the ap-
pealability of sentences: (1) an illegal sentence is coram non judice; therefore no jeopardy
consequences attach to an order or judgment which a court does not have jurisdiction to
pronounce; and (2) a corrected or modified sentence is not multiple punishment, but rather
a revision of a single punishment.
Presumptive sentencing statutes and statutes authorizing prosecutorial appeals of
sentences began to spread in the 1970's. State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 347-51, 471 A.2d 370,
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In all of the circumstances above where double jeopardy would not bar
reprosecution, a statute may allow the prosecutor to appeal. This is ex-
actly what Congress has done by statute authorizing prosecutorial appeals
to the very limits of double jeopardy. 125
The Supreme Court's recent emphasis on the need for a determination
of the merits of a case before further proceedings will be barred signals a
return to a view akin to the traditional doctrine embodied in the pleas in
bar.126 The double jeopardy clause now serves its original function of fi-
376-79 (1984) (documenting the ascendency of "offense-oriented, non-individualized deter-
minative sentencing" in academic literature and statutes). See generally von Hirsch and
Hanrahan, Determinative Penalty Systems in America, an Overview, 27 CRIME AND DELINQ.
289 (1981); von Hirsch, Recent Trends in American Criminal Sentencing Theory, 42 MD. L.
REV. 6, 31-32 (1983) (considering the role of statutory parole release guidelines in the pre-
sumptive sentencing movement). Currently, prosecutors in more than half of the states can
appeal sentences. Recent Pennsylvania legislation exemplifies the trend, establishing a mini-
mum sentence of five years imprisonment for specific grave offenses committed with the use
of a firearm, or committed on public transportation, or for second or subsequent such of-
fenses. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 9712-9714 (Purdon 1982). Sentencing guidelines also ap-
pear in VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-10, 18.2-11 (Repl. Vol. 1982), but, because the commonwealth
may not appeal illegally lenient sentences, the minimum sentence provisions are, in effect,
advisory only.
There is one caveat related to the concept of double jeopardy in sentencing: if a defendant
procures the reversal of a conviction, upon reconviction at a new trial, if he is awarded a
greater sentence, due process requires that the sentencing judge affirmatively set forth in
the record the justification for the greater sentence. This rule aims to prevent chilling of the
right to appeal for fear of retaliatory sentencing at a second trial. A lesser sentence is not an
implied "acquittal" of all greater sentences. See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711
(1969).
125. See Annotation, Dismissal of Indictment or Information as Reviewable on Appeal
by United States under 18 U.S.C.S. § 3731, as amended by Omnibus Crime Control Act of
1970, 30 A.L.R. FED. 655, 661-63 (1976).
126. The Court has begun to use the language of "continuing jeopardy," which derives
from the neglected case of State v. Lee, 65 Conn. 265, 30 A. 110 (1894). Lydon, 466 U.S. 294
(Brennan, Marshall, J.J., concurring in part); Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317
(1984). The theory of "continuing jeopardy" was espoused by Justice Holmes in Kepner v.
United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting). The gist of the theory, in its
original form, is that jeopardy continues until a judgment on the merits free from reversible
error is obtained, regardless of the number of "trials" or presentations of evidence required.
Thus, a judgment is truly final only when affirmed by the court of last resort. The Supreme
Court once refused to overturn a famous Connecticut judgment embodying this doctrine.
Connecticut v. Palko, 122 Conn. 529, 191 A. 320 (1938), aff'd, 302 U.S. 319 (1937). At the
time of the Palko decision, the Connecticut Constitution did not contain a double jeopardy
clause, and the Supreme Court declined to apply the double jeopardy clause in the Bill of
Rights as a requirement of "due process" under the fourteenth amendment. Hence, the
state could appeal jury acquittals allegedly tainted by legal error until a pure verdict on the
merits was obtained. This theory does not recognize the doctrine of jury nullification in that
it holds that a jury acquittal based on legal error is reversible. The doctrine of jury nullifica-
tion is now, however, a constitutionally mandated aspect of double jeopardy, and will allow
the jury to acquit against the law. Hence, there can be no reversible error in a jury acquittal.
United States v. Powell, 447 U.S. 530, 540 (1980); see supra note 87. While it is doubtful
that the Supreme Court will ever adopt the "continuing jeopardy" theory in its most sinewy
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nalizing acquittals and convictions, and the jury discharge aspect of the
clause has been pared back to the policing of intentional governmental
oppression. The jury discharge/jeopardy rule developed to protect the ac-
cused from abusive practices which were designed to increase the likeli-
hood of conviction, and the Court has been careful to preserve this
function.
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY DOCTRINE IN VIRGINIA
A. Historical Background
The English doctrines surrounding the pleas of autrefois acquit and
convict were part of the common law heritage of Virginia."' Virginia also
inherited an unsettled state of law concerning the discharge of juries and
followed a discretionary rule even before that rule emerged in England.128
Virginia was one of the first states to deny the prosecution the right to
writs of error in criminal cases in the absence of a statute or constitu-
tional provision.'29 However, Virginia was among the first states to enact
a provision authorizing prosecutorial appeals. In 1840, the Virginia legis-
lature provided that "[iun all motions or prosecutions for the violations of
form, allowing reversals of acquittals, the language associated with the theory at least serves
well to explain the demise of the Wilson and Jenkins one-shot prosecution approach, and
what has been, to some, the Court's puzzling "new" focus on guilt or innocence (a tack back
towards the common law pleas in bar). If jeopardy were held to continue uninterrupted
through judicial proceedings at least until the merits of the case were decided, erroneously
or not, the accused would not be placed, literally, twice in jeopardy until entitled, as at
common law, to a plea of autrefois acquit or convict. For more information on the continu-
ing jeopardy theory, see Note, Right of State to Appeal in Criminal Cases, 4 VA. L. REG. 923
(1919) (new series).
127. J. RANDOLPH & E. BARRADALL, II VIRGINIA COLONIAL DECISIONs B50-B51 (1909). The
defendant could be retried after a dismissal because the venire facias had been awarded to
the wrong county. The defendant's life was never in jeopardy because the first proceeding
had been defective.
The common law of England, so far as it is not repugnant to the bill of rights and
constitution of this state, shall continue in full force within the same, and be the rule
of decision in ascertaining and punishing all offenses against the state, except in those
respects where it is, or shall be altered by the General Assembly.
1847-1848 Va. Acts 120, § 1, p.9 3 . It is still one of the most fundamental principles of law in
this country that the living tradition of the common law controls where a constitution or
legislative enactment does not contradict it. E.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 1-10 (Repl. Vol. 1979); see
also Sigler, supra note 13, at 300-01.
128. Before Winsor, 10 Cox C.C. 276 (1865), the Virginia Court held in Commonwealth v.
Fells, 36 Va. ( Leigh) 613 (1838), that judges did possess discretionary power to discharge
juries before verdict even in felony cases and that such discharges could not result in acquit-
tal. The court exhorted that this power be exercised cautiously in cases of necessity and
interpreted the fifth amendment jeopardy clause in the United States Constitution as per-
fectly consistent with the common law. Id. at 619.
129. Commonwealth v. Harrison, 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 202 (1820); Commonwealth v. Myers,
4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 160 (1819); Commonwealth v. Highland Crowe, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 125
(1800).
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any act relating to the revenue, the commonwealth shall have the right to
appeal or obtain a writ of error."130 The commonwealth's right to writs of
error was later expanded to cases in which a trial court held unconstitu-
tional the statute upon which an indictment had been founded. 13 1 Be-
cause the nineteenth century Virginia Constitution did not contain a
double jeopardy clause, the full scope of the power conferred by these
statutes included the reversal of acquittals.
By the middle of the nineteenth century, many states' courts had
adopted the jury discharge/jeopardy rule.' 3 In Williams v. Common-
wealth,'3 3 the Virginia general court suggested that it had adopted the
new rule. 34 However, the judiciary's potentially expansive interpretation
of former jeopardy was checked by the legislature which statutorily codi-
fied the traditional rules in 1848. The first of the new enactments con-
sisted of two sections.1 35 One section expressed the res judicata concept
underlying the plea of autrefois acquit, modifying the Vaux rule so that
an acquittal on the merits would not be vitiated by technical defects in
the indictment."36 The other section specified that a discharge solely be-
cause of a defect in the indictment would not bar reprosecution; 37 an
130. 1840 Va. Acts 2, § 37, p.15.
131. 1898 Va. Acts 592, § 1, codified at VA. CODE § 4052 (Supp. 1898).
132. E.g., Commonwealth v. Cook, 6 Serg. & Rawle 577 (Pa. 1822); see also supra note 70
(sources describing the spread of the jury discharge/jeopardy rule).
133. 43 Va. (2 Gratt.) 568 (1845).
134. Williams, however, was a habeas corpus case in which the court ordered the release
of the defendant still being held in custody after a deadlocked jury had been discharged.
The court freed Williams without pronouncing him acquitted. A second indictment had not
been brought against him, and the court did not hold that reprosecution would be barred.
The precise rule established by the case was that the state could not detain a defendant
after an abortive trial. The court did endorse the new jeopardy rule, but instructed that it
would have approved if the jury had been kept together until the end of the lower court's
term, when the jury would have been discharged by operation of law. Id. at 570-71. Such a
practice evidences the original understanding of the new jeopardy rule as a guarantee only
against governmental overreaching.
135. 1848 Va. Acts 120, §§ 10-11 (codified at VA. CODE ch. 199, §§ 15-16 (1849)).
136. No person shall be held to answer on a second indictment ... for any offense of
which he has been acquitted by the jury, upon the facts and merits, on a former trial;
but such acquittal may be pleaded by him in bar of any prosecution for the same
offense, notwithstanding any defect in the form, or in the substance of the indictment
... on which he was acquitted.
1848 Va. Acts 120, § 10. This section recognizes the power of "jury nullification," or the
power of a jury to acquit contrary to law and facts. See also Westen, The Three Faces of
Double Jeopardy: Reflections on Government Appeals of Criminal Sentences, 78 MicK. L.
REv. 1001, 1012-23 (1980).
137. Any person indicted... [for] an offense, who on his trial shall be acquitted upon
the ground of a variance between the allegations and the proof, or upon any excep-
tion to the form or substance of the indictment ... may be arraigned again on a new
indictment.., and tried and convicted for the same offense, nowwithstanding such
former acquittal.
1848 Va. Acts 120, § 11.
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affirmative finding of factual innocence would be both necessary and suf-
ficient to shield the accused from reprosecution. The second 1848 legisla-
tive enactment specifically addressed the dictum in Williams: "[tihe
court may discharge the jury in any criminal prosecution . . . [when it]
appear[s] that they cannot agree in their verdict, or that there is a mani-
fest necessity for such discharge."'' 3s
The nineteenth century Virginia law on former jeopardy rejected the
intrusion of the jury discharge rule, as demonstrated by Robinson v. Com-
monwealth."39 In Robinson, the court upheld a conviction for larceny ob-
tained upon reprosecution. After discovering a discrepancy in the indict-
ment, the trial court discharged the jury over the defendant's objection.
At the subsequent trial on a new indictment, the defendant entered a
plea of former jeopardy, which the court overruled. The court of appeals
granted the defendant's petition for a writ of error and upheld the convic-
tion. Defendant's counsel argued for a jury discharge/jeopardy rule, citing
many cases from the growing number of jurisdictions which had adopted
the rule. The legislature had decided, however, that an abortive trial
could not result in an acquittal. The court noted that "our statute puts
that question at rest forever."'' 40
B. Constitutional Prohibition
The Virginia Constitution provisions prohibiting double jeopardy and
appeals by the commonwealth in criminal cases first appeared in 1902.14'1
138. Id. at 21, § 23 (emphasis added) (codified at VA. CODE tit. 55, ch. 208, § 12 (1860).
The provision survives today in VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-36 (Repl. Vol. 1984).
139. 73 Va. (32 Gratt) 866 (1879).
140. Id. at 872. The court reiterated the traditional rules in Price v. Commonwealth, 74
Va. (33 Gratt.) 819, 824-25 (1880), and the two former jeopardy provisions appeared un-
changed in the new 1887 Code. VA. CODE §§ 3893-3894 (1887). The "question," however, did
not rest for long. In Dulin v. Lillard, 91 Va. 718, 20 S.E. 821 (1895), a new supreme court of
appeals resumed agitation for the jury discharge rule:
In order to make such a defense [of former jeopardy] with success, the party relying
upon it must show that he has been put upon his trial before a court which has
jurisdiction, upon indictment or information which is sufficient in form and substance
to sustain a conviction, and that a jury has been empaneled and sworn, and thus
charged with his deliverance. Anything short of this, is insufficient to raise a bar
against a new indictment or prosecution for the same offense.
Id. at 722, 20 S.E. at 822. This passage reads like a hornbook recipe for the new jury dis-
charge/jeopardy rule. See, e.g., T. COOLEY, Constitutional Limitations *326-27. The Dulin
court could not apply the rule, however, because the indictment had been dismissed before
the jury was empanelled. At the turn of the century the court threatened to adopt the new
rule in spite of the legislature's attempt to forestall it statutorily. The change in the court's
mood between Robinson and Dulin might be attributable to the fact that all of the members
of the Court changed. The post-war Constitution of 1869 established a new court providing
for five judges and a reporter, to serve twelve-year terms. Dulin was the first case decided by
the new court, on January 17, 1895. See 91 Va. xix-xxi (Preface) (1895).
141. The two provisions were embodied, respectively, in the Bill of Rights, art. I, § 8, and
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The framers of these provisions equated prosecutorial appeals with the
reversal of acquittals and attempted to constitutionalize the common law
right to the pleas in bar by denying writs of error to the commonwealth,
except in revenue cases. Berryman Green, Chairman of the Committee on
Preamble and Bill of Rights, presented the recommendations of that
committee to the convention, explaining the committee's proposal to add
"nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense"'142 to
article I, section 8 of the constitution. 4 3 The committee recommended
that the traditional finality of the trial process be constitutionally de-
clared to guard against future encroachment. It was assumed that a trial
would be tried to completion and the case determined, after which the
law would direct either punishment or freedom. However, in none of the
records of the convention do any of the representatives mention the jury
discharge rule or indicate that the double jeopardy clause would alter the
law as practiced.
4
As soon as the convention approved the double jeopardy provision pre-
pared by Berryman Green's committee, 4 5 an exception to the double
art. VI, § 38.
142. REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON PREAMBLE, BILL OF RIGHTS, ETC., COMMITTEE REPORTS,
JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF VIRGINIA 1-4 (1901) [hereinafter JOURNAL].
143. [T]hose words have never before appeared in a Virginia Constitution or in the Bill of
Rights. . . . [W]e have heretofore relied upon the fundamental principle of English
law, which protects the accused from everlasting persecution by the powerful arm of
the State. But it has so long been practiced, it has been so long accepted as an abso-
lute right of a person accused of crime, that he shall not be everlastingly harassed by
the power of the State, but shall have his fair and honest trial and then go to punish-
ment or to freedom, as the law may direct and as the case may be determined, that it
does seem to me if there is a fundamental right in the world which ought to be de-
clared, it is the right that a man shall not twice be put in jeopardy for the same
offence ....
No man can tell when it may be thought necessary to provide that a man shall not
be tried more than once.
1 REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 102 (J.
Lindsay ed. 1906) [hereinafter REPORT 'OF THE PROCEEDINGS]. Concerning the importance of
the debates at this constitutional convention in construing the language of the constitution,
see the editorial note of an unnamed member of the same 1901-02 Committee on Preamble,
Bill of Rights, which Mr. Green chaired, in 9 VA. L. REG. 960 (1904).
144. William B. Pettit, recent President of the Virginia Bar Association and another
member of the Committee on Preamble, Bill of Rights, dissented to this prophylactic provi-
sion. "No person was ever liable, under the law of the land ... to be twice put in jeopardy
for the same offence [sic]. Why forbid a thing that was already interdicted-a thing that
could never occur in Virginia . . . ." MINORITY REPORT OF THE COMMITTE ON PREAMBLE,
ETC. JOURNAL supra note 142. Mr. Green's speech indicated that the provision was not
adopted as a remedy for existing wrongs. See supra note 143 ("no man can tell when it may
be thought necessary . . . ."). See also the speech of D.Q. Eggleston in 7 REPORT OF THE
PROCEEDINGS, supra note 143, at 1632. "The principle of common law which provides that
no man shall twice be put in jeopardy for the same offense, has been inviolate in this State
from time immemorial." Id.
145. REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 143, at 393.
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jeopardy clause was proposed for revenue cases. 146 It was thought that an
exception was needed for revenue appeals because standing alone the
double jeopardy clause would render meaningless the statute authorizing
prosecutorial appeals.1 7 The perceived need for such an exception points
to the conclusion that, when the convention broadly prohibited
prosecutorial appeals, its members thought that all such appeals sought
to disturb acquittals. The anti-appeal provision was, therefore, no more
than a restatement of the double jeopardy concept. The constitution fi-
nally produced by the convention contained the double jeopardy clause, a
revenue exception, and the Committee on Judiciary's original proposal on
prosecutorial appeals. 14 8
In the next edition of the Virginia Code, the statutes concerning the
effect of a former acquittal and the commonwealth's right to writs of er-
ror appeared exactly as they had before the constitutional convention. 14 9
The annotations to section 3894 of the code found the new former jeop-
ardy provision in section 8 of the constitution perfectly harmonious with
the pre-existing common law tradition: "[t]o avail of the defence of twice
in jeopardy, the defendant must plead autrefois acquit or convict.""'
However, advocates of the jury discharge rule began to rally around a new
banner. The constitution contained that magic word, "jeopardy. '15'
Commonwealth v. Perrow5 2 was the first post-constitution case to sub-
stantially affect Virginia law on former jeopardy and prosecutorial ap-
peals. Upon Perrow's appeal from a district court conviction, the circuit
court held unconstitutional a state revenue law requiring labor agents in
Buckingham County to obtain licenses, thereby quashing the warrant for
Perrow's arrest and discharging him. Violation of the statute, in its own
terms, was a misdemeanor punishable only by fine. In dismissing the
146. Id. "Except that an appeal may be allowed to the Commonwealth in all cases for the
violation of a law relating to the State revenue." Id. This exception was proposed by Attor-
ney Eppa Hunton, Chairman of the Committee on Judiciary.
147. Id. at 394. "[U]nless that amendment is adopted a statute of the State of Virginia,
which has been upon its statute books for years, will be nullified and rendered unconstitu-
tional." Id.
148. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF VIRGINIA ADOPTED BY THE CONVENTION OF 1901-2,
IN JOURNAL art. I, § 8, and art. VI, § 88, supra note 142, at 2-3, 22, respectively. This docu-
ment was promulgated in July of 1902 and affirmed by the supreme court of appeals, defects
in the process of its creation notwithstanding. Taylor v. Commonwealth, 101 Va. 829, 44
S.E. 754 (1903).
149. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 3893-94, 4052 (1904).
150. Id. § 3894 (quoting Justice v. Commonwealth, 81 Va. 209 (1885)).
151. In 1904, an article entitled Former Jeopardy appeared in the Virginia Law Register,
campaigning for the new jury discharge/jeopardy rule. Harvey, Former Jeopardy, 10 VA. L.
REG. 410 (1904). An editorial note following this article, however, defended the traditional
Virginia position, maintaining that the new provision in the constitution "merely makes lex
scripta what was already lex non scripta," and should be interpreted in light of sections
3893 and 3894 of the Code. 10 VA. L. REG. 419, 419-20 (1904) (editor's note).
152. 124 Va. 805, 97 S.E. 820 (1919).
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commonwealth's petition for a writ of error, the supreme court of appeals
navigated the felevant constitutional sections in four tacks.
First, section 88 of the constitution barred appeals of cases involving
"life and liberty" punishment, but permitted appeals of all state revenue
cases, regardless of the authorized sentence. Perrow was not a "life and
liberty" case, and therefore did not fall within the proscription of section
88.153 Judge Kelly's analysis seemed to authorize the legislature to reenact
a provision allowing prosecutorial appeals of constitutionality rulings in
cases involving a fine only. 154 However, what he gave with this ruling, he
took back with the next.
Second, section 8 of the constitution, the double jeopardy clause, did
apply to cases involving fines only and barred the commonwealth's ap-
peal.155 The court held that in any case not involving state revenue it
could not reverse a judgment for the accused and order a new trial. More-
over, the court did not have jurisdiction to hear an appeal which sought
such a reversal.1 56
Third, by adopting an expanded version of the new jury discharge/jeop-
ardy rule, the court was able to hold that any discharge of the defendant
upon the law or facts at any time during trial (or upon appeal from a
conviction) would be treated as an acquittal, thus barring future
153. Id. at 810-11, 97 S.E. at 822.
154. "[T]hus leaving the Legislature, so far as this particular section [§ 88] of the Consti-
tution is concerned, a free hand with reference to appeals in criminal cases where no other
punishment than a fine is prescribed." Id.
155. Id.
156. The influence of the philosophy in Judge Burks' article, Burks, Former Jeopardy, 6
VA. L. REG. 243 (1900), is apparent in the court's opinion:
When the purpose of an appeal in a criminal case is to procure on behalf of the State
a reversal of the judgment and a new trial of the accused (as distinguished from a
mere review and decision on the legal question involved for use as a precedent in
future cases) the rule against a second jeopardy for the same offense operates proprio
vigore to destroy the right of appeal. The matter is jurisdictional, and the accused is
not obliged to first abide the result of the appeal, and, in the event of a reversal,
resort to his plea of autrefois acquit or autrefois convict to avoid a second trial.
Commonwealth v. Perrow, 124 Va. 805, 811, 97 S.E. 820, 822 (1919). The court seems to
assume that there are only two possible purposes for a prosecutorial appeal, the reversal of
an acquittal or the resolution of moot legal questions (the same assumptions made by Judge
Burks in 1900). Moot proceedings, however, were renounced by the Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals, both before and after the publication of Judge Burks' article. See Hamer v.
Commonwealth, 107 Va. 636, 637, 59 S.E. 400, 401 (1908); Franklin v. Peers, 95 Va. 602, 89
S.E. 321 (1898). But see 1976-77 Op. Va. Atty. Gen. 10 (advisory appeals would not involve
life and liberty, avoiding VA. CONsT. art. 6, § 1, and would not violate the double jeopardy
clause); 2 A. HOWARD, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF VIRGINIA 716-17 (1974) (moot
appellate review in Virginia not prohibited by a constitutional "case" or "controversy" re-
quirement, as in U.S. CONsT. art. 3, § 2). There was no such thing as a -moot appeal in
Virginia in 1919, notwithstanding the seemingly favorable mention of such a chimera in
Perrow.
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proceedings.157
The final question remaining was whether the law involved in Perrow
might indeed qualify as a state revenue law exempted from the double
jeopardy provision in section 8. Although the law in question was a state
licensing law,158 the court held that it served a local policing purpose and
was not the kind of state revenue law the constitution had intended to
exempt. By construing the statute outside of the revenue exception, the
constitutional double jeopardy provision decided the case. The new one-
shot-prosecution jeopardy rule had finally been announced not as dic-
tum, 159 but as binding precedent 60
The court in Perrow held that reprosecution would be prohibited
"whenever a defendant . . .[had] been .. .discharged upon a defense
constituting a bar to the proceeding, whether the defense rested upon the
law or the facts."161 This holding, in effect, made a final judgment of ac-
quittal out of any discharge of the defendant at any point in the trial,
including the dismissal of an indictment in pre-trial proceedings based on
157. There was no jury trial in the instant case, and we have not overlooked the fact that
jeopardy, as ordinarily understood in legal parlance, refers to the danger of conviction
and punishment which a defendant incurs in a criminal case where a jury has been
empaneled and sworn. But we are of opinion that the spirit and purpose of the immu-
nity intended to be secured by the doctrine in question will be violated whenever a
defendant in any criminal case has been formerly tried by competent author-
ity-whether court or jury-and discharged upon a defense constituting a bar to the
proceeding, whether that defense be rested upon the law or the facts.
Perrow, 124 Va. at 815, 97 S.E. at 823. This broad reading of section 8 in Perrow has had
resounding effects on Virginia law. See, e.g., 1958-59 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 88 (letter to Com-
monwealth's Attorney for Arlington County, advising that discharge of defendant on
grounds of unconstitutionality of statute was unreviewable, although only a fine was in-
volved. Section 8, the opinion asserted, precluded appeal because it precluded reprosecu-
tion, even though the case had been dismissed before jeopardy would ordinarily be said to
have attached). Perrow's strict one-shot prosecution rule abrogated even the ancient rule
that a defendant could be reprosecuted after obtaining the reversal of his conviction. Perrow
does not even allow the reinstatement of a former conviction without reprosecution because
an appeal would be destroyed proprio vigore.
158. 1900 Va. Acts 868. The Act, part of the State Tax Code, is construed in Perrow, 124
Va. at 815-16, 97 S.E. at 823-24.
159. See Commonwealth v. Wilcox, 111 Va. 849, 69 S.E. 1027 (1911). The court dismissed
the Attorney General's petition for a writ of error sought under the authority of the 1898
provision which allowed appeals of cases in which statutes had been declared unconstitu-
tional. The court declared that in cases involving "life or liberty" section 88 of the constitu-
tion had preserved the right to a writ of error for the commonwealth only if a revenue law
were involved. The court indicated that it had adopted the jury discharge rule, but that the
facts in the case did not present that issue, and the holding, therefore, did not depend on it.
160. The next edition of the Code after Perrow, in 1924, featured a three and one-half
page annotation to § 4774 (acquittal), with 141 citations. VA. CODE ANN. § 4774, (1924). An
editorial note following Perrow in the Virginia Law Register began the* dissent immediately.
Note, Right of State to Appeal in Criminal Cases, 4 VA. LAW REG. 923 (1919). The note
presented the "continuing jeopardy" theory.
161. Perrow, 124 Va. at 815, 97 S.E. at 823.
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
technical defects or the unconstitutionality of a statute. At the time the
constitution was created, there was only one kind of acquittal-"by the
jury, upon the facts and merits."'" 2 Under Perrow's radical form of one-
shot-prosecution jeopardy doctrine, however, all trial terminations in
favor of the defendant are "acquittals." Perrow eliminated the prosecu-
tor's common law "horizontal" access to new proceedings as well as any
access to "vertical" appellate proceedings which managed to survive the
"life and liberty" anti-prosecutorial appeal clause in the constitution.
The Perrow rule, was applied in Adkins v. Commonwealth.'63 In Ad-
kins, the indictment had been dismissed. Although no jury had been
sworn and the commonwealth had not introduced evidence, the court
held that dismissal barred reindictment, notwithstanding the fact that
the appellate court believed the trial court's assessment of the law had
been erroneous and that the evidence of the accused's factual guilt was
clear.'6
4
Perrow and Adkins exerted a tremendous influence over Virginia law.
In 1981, the Virginia Supreme Court was still trying to explain how Ad-
kins had been conclusively acquitted by a pre-jeopardy non-merits dis-
missal,' 65 while holding that a dismissal would not bar reprosecution un-
less granted pursuant to a factual defense. 166 The 1982 case of Greenwalt
v. Commonwealth'' reaffirmed this holding; however, it is still unclear
whether a dismissal on the merits will bar reprosecution if the case is
dismissed before the attachment of jeopardy."' Otherwise, Virginia law
on double jeopardy now closely parallels federal law. By the middle of the
twentieth century, the Virginia Supreme Court had decided that, for pur-
poses of determining the preclusive effect of mistrial declarations, jeop-
ardy attaches when the defendant is put to trial before the trier of fact,
and the trial can be terminated prematurely for manifest necessity with-
out barring further proceedings.' 69
162. See supra notes 136, 137, 150.
163. 175 Va. 590, 9 S.E.2d 349 (1940).
164. Id. at 597, 9 S.E.2d at 352.
165. "Adkins had.., been fully discharged... by a ruling which as a matter of law
barred further proceedings .... Therefore his discharge constituted a true acquittal upon
a defense which barred his reprosecution." Johnson v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 736, 742-43,
273 S.E.2d 784, 788-89 (emphasis added), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 920 (1981).
166. 221 Va. at 743-44, 273 S.E.2d at 789 (following United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82
(1978)).
167. 224 Va. 498, 297 S.E.2d 709 (1982).
168. The court decided in Moore v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 388, 237 S.E.2d 187 (1977),
that dismissal of a felony warrant in a preliminary hearing would not bar further proceed-
ings. Jeopardy had not attached, but this result might have following because the district
court did not have jurisdiction to try a felony.
169. Rosser v. Commonwealth, 159 Va. 1028, 167 S.E. 257 (1933), clarified that, at least
with respect to mistrials, Virginia would follow the rule that in a trial to the bench, jeopardy
attaches when the court begins to hear evidence, and in a jury trial, upon the swearing of
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With respect to appeals by the state, however, Virginia law is conspicu-
ously out of step. Prosecutorial appeals spread rapidly during the twenti-
eth century, the most significant development being the Federal Criminal
Appeals Act of 1907,170 which served as a model for many state statutes.
Other state prosecutors have been granted broad rights of appeal in order
to test and define the complex protective features of modern criminal law.
Unfortunately, the development of such appellate rights in Virginia has
been stymied by the constitution.
IV. UPDATING THE VIRGINIA CONSTITUTION AND THE CODE
A commission appointed by the Governor to study the Virginia Consti-
tution and recommend revisions submitted its report in 1969, advocating
prosecutorial appeals to the limits prescribed by the concept of double
jeopardy.' 7' The commission recommended that the prohibition against
commonwealth's appeals in section 8 be removed, as an issue "best left to
the General Assembly rather than frozen into the Constitution.' '1 2
The objective of the commission was to give back to the legislature the
ability to determine by statute when commonwealth's appeals would be
needed in order to keep pace with other developments in criminal proce-
dure and double jeopardy philosophy. The double jeopardy provision in
section 8 and the federal standard under the fifth amendment would
mark the limit to which the legislature could grant commonwealth's ap-
peals. 17' However, the same appeal provision which formerly appeared in
section 8 was restored by the House of Delegates in what emerged from
the 1969-70 session as article VI, section 1, of the current constitution." 4
the jury. Mack v. Commonwealth, 177 Va. 921, 15 S.E.2d 62 (1941), reaffirmed the rule in
Rosser, but did not disturb Perrow with respect to dismissals. By the end of the next dec-
ade, the court had also established firmly that if the accused moved to set aside a verdict of
guilty, or requested a new trial after conviction, he waived his former jeopardy. See Cross v.
Commonwealth, 195 Va. 62, 77 S.E.2d 447 (1953); Mealy v. Commonwealth, 193 Va. 216, 68
S.E.2d 507 (1952).
170. 34 Stat. 1246 (1907).
171. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STAN-
DARDS RELATING TO CRIMINAL APPEALS (Approved Draft) § 1.4, at 33-40 (1970) [hereinafter
STANDARDS].
172. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON CONSTITUTIONAL REvIsION 186 (1969). The commis-
sion consisted of such prominent members of the Virginia legal community as Lewis F. Pow-
ell, Jr., Justices Harrison, Cochran, and Harmon of the Virginia Supreme Court, Federal
District Court Judges Bryan and Dalton, Professors Colgate, W. Darden, Hardy Cross Dil-
lard and constitutional scholar A.E. Dick Howard.
173. A. HOWARD, supra note 156, at 715-16.
174. The House Standing Committee on Courts of Justice received the recommendations
of the Revision Commission, and restored the provision denying the commonwealth the
right to appeal, except in state revenue cases, before submitting the judiciary article as
H.R.J. RES. 12. The Senate agreed to the version of art. VI, § 1, submitted by the Senate
Committee for Courts of Justice (S.J.Ras. 12), which did not contain the old provision bar-
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Recommendations for the amendment of the constitution to allow
prosecutorial appeals have continued. In 1976, a Joint Bar Study Com-
mission, appointed by the Virginia Judicial Council to study the Ameri-
can Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice,17 5 recommended
that the Virginia Constitution be amended to allow prosecutorial ap-
peals. 17 The issue has since been studied by the Attorney General's Of-
fice and the General Assembly's Joint Courts of Justice Subcommittee on
Prosecution Appeals. 77 Recently, two different amendments have been
considered by the legislature. 7
8
Earnest attempts to remove the constitutional restriction on
prosecutorial appeals have been made. House Joint Resolution 133
(H.J.R. 133) in 1983 would have allowed prosecutorial appeals from or-
ders quashing warrants or indictments or suppressing evidence and re-
quiring the return of seized property, all prior to the attachment of jeop-
ardy. 78 H.J.R. 96 in 1984 was restricted to felony cases and specified the
attachment points for jeopardy in jury and bench trials. 80 This resolution
would have allowed appeals of only those orders dismissing warrants, in-
dictments, or information on grounds of unconstitutionality of a statute
and orders suppressing evidence by operation of the exclusionary rule
provided that the prosecutor certified the essentiality of the excluded
ring appeals. PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE SENATE OF VIRGINIA PERTAINING TO AMEND-
MENT OF THE CONSTITUTION, 33-035, 109, (C. Woltz ed. 1969-70). The House of Delegates,
however, insisted that its version of article VI, section 1, be adopted. A conference commit-
tee was appointed to draft a compromise resolution, and the version finally approved con-
tained the clause from old section 88. Id. at 504-05, 508, 514, 530, 834. In presenting H.R.J.
RES. 12 to the House, Mr. Moore, Chairman of the Standing Committee for Courts of Jus-
tice, reported "the Committee's thought that this specific statement [former § 88] should
. . . be in the constitution to assure that the commonwealth cannot appeal generally in
criminal cases and harass people unnecessarily; also to preserve the specific right of appeal
on revenue matters." Both of the reasons given by Mr. Moore are difficult to defend. The
Supreme Court of Virginia has not granted a writ of error under the revenue exception in a
reported case since Roanoke v. Donckers, 187 Va. 491, 47 S.E.2d 440 (1948), and even there
the court held that the exception did not apply. Thus, the revenue exception, though appar-
ently highly esteemed by Mr. Moore, is of somewhat limited utility. Moreover, the common-
wealth would not be able to "appeal generally" if the legislature restricted appeals by stat-
ute, or simply gave the appellate court discretionary power to grant or refuse writs of error.
175. See supra note 171.
176. REPORT OF THE JOINT BAR COMMITEE STUDY OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 88-90 (October 7, 1976). The recommendations of this
commission are also noted in OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, COMPREHENSIVE JUDICIAL PLAN, H-
26-H-27 (1977).
177. The subcommittee was appointed pursuant to H.R.J. RES. 159, 1983 Va. Acts 1310, to
study the expansion of appellate rights for the accused, and to prepare implementing legis-
lation for a proposed constitutional amendment to allow prosecutorial appeals.
178. H.R.J. RES. 133, 1983 Va. Acts 1241 and H.R.J. RES. 96, x Sess. 1984 Sess., Va.
(stricken on February 2, 1985).
179. H.R.J. RES. 133, 1983 Va. Acts 1241.
180. H.R.J. RES. 96.
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Senate Joint Resolution 53 (S.J.R. 53) (which contained the provision
originally proposed in H.J.R. 133) and the newer provision in H.J.R. 96
were both considered by the General Assembly in the 1985 session. The
house and senate ultimately approved a version of H.J.R. 96; this propo-
sal became S.J.R. 53 by substitution. After election of house members in
November 1985, the General Assembly approved H.J.R. 126182 in the 1986
session, an unamended version of S.J.R. 53. House Bill 699 (1986) pro-
vides for a voter referendum on the issue in the November 1987
election.183
Although the proposal in H.J.R. 126 represents some progress towards
modernizing Virginia's outdated one-way appellate avenue, its provisions,
when viewed in light of the very broad prosecutorial appellate rights in
other states, are timorously narrow.' In felony cases, the resolution al-
lows appeal of an order dismissing an indictment on the grounds that the
underlying statute is unconstitutional and of an order to suppress evi-
dence or a confession on the grounds that it was obtained in a manner
violative of the United States or Virginia Constitutions. While these two
types of orders are among the most controversial, and the right to appeal
them is most desired by prosecutors, there are many other judgments and
orders which are not listed in H.J.R. 126 which have great potential for
error prejudicial to the interests of the citizens of the commonwealth.' 8 5
Still more disappointing is the fact that the General Assembly seems
compelled to immunize its first halting steps in the constitution. Texas is
the only other state which has a constitutional limitation on prosecutorial
appeals, and this provision has been circumvented by creative legislation
which has been supported by the Texas courts.8 6 The Virginia General
Assembly, presumably fearing a future runaway statutory expansion of
prosecutorial appellate rights, is attempting to exert dead-hand control
over the future of prosecutorial appeals by refusing to simply remove the
constitutional prohibition of such appeals. The legislature could remove
181. Id.
182. H.R.J. RES. 126, 1986 Sess., Va.
183. H.R. 699, 1986 Sess., Va.
184. See supra note 109.
185. E.g., People v. Vilt, 119 Ill. App. 3d 832, 457 N.E.2d 136 (1983) (appeal from a
double jeopardy dismissal); People v. Rehlman, 62 Cal. 2d 135, 396 P.2d 913, 41 Cal. Rptr.
457 (1964) (review of exculpatory miscalculations of time with respect to statute of limita-
tions). Proposed amendments to the Virginia Constitution have provided for appeals of or-
ders suppressing evidence allegedly obtained in violation of the constitution (H.R.J. RES. 96),
but not for evidence allegedly violative of the confrontation clause. The errors not provided
for in the amendments can damage the commonwealth's case as irreparably as the suppres-
sion of evidence erroneously held to have been illegally obtained.
186. Todd v. State, 661 S.W. 2d 116 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983); Tax. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN.
art. 4401 (Vernon Supp. 1985).
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the constitutional provision and write a statute like H.J.R. 126, allowing
future legislatures to expand, contract, and "tune" the statute to fit the
needs of the criminal justice system. This is now the manner in which
authorization for prosecutorial appeals is handled in almost every other
state. The experience of other states has shown that prosecutorial appeals
are rarely used, even if authorized up to the limits of double jeopardy.
The trend throughout the United States has been towards expanding
prosecutorial appellate rights.'8 7 However, measures being taken by the
Virginia General Assembly are unduly conservative and may manifest a
fear of imagined future widespread oppression of defendants.
Among the most vocal opponents of a broad authorization of
prosecutorial appeals is Delegate Theodore V. Morrison, Jr., D-Newport
News. Morrison demonstrated a general confusion as to the relationship
of double jeopardy to prosecutorial appeals. He objected to the H.J.R. 133
proposal because it allowed the state to appeal "from any decision, judg-
ment, or order dismissing a warrant or indictment or information as to
any one or more counts. . . prior to the defendant's being placed in jeop-
ardy.' 88 He felt that "some future General Assembly might decide that
defendants are not in jeopardy until the end of a trial and might permit
the state to appeal any ruling against it during the course of a trial."' 8 9
Jeopardy currently "attaches" upon the swearing of a jury in a jury
trial, and in a bench trial upon the swearing of the first witness or when
the prosecutor begins to introduce evidence. H.J.R. 96, favored by Morri-
son, specifies these events as the point in a trial after which no
prosecutorial appeals can be taken. H.J.R. 133, on the other hand, speaks
only of the attachment of jeopardy. Therefore, the argument goes, a fu-
ture General Assembly could decide to move the point at which jeopardy
attaches to some time later in the trial, thus extending the point up to
which the prosecutor could appeal. Morrison's argument is flawed on its
face. The Supreme Court has decided when jeopardy attaches, and it is
not within the authority of the General Assembly or the Virginia Su-
preme Court to decide otherwise. Furthermore, the only significance of
the attachment of jeopardy is that if a mistrial is afterwards declared the
defendant must consent, or there must be "manifest necessity" to prevent
injustice, else he will be technically acquitted. The concept of double
jeopardy functions primarily to prohibit reprosecution after an acquittal
on the merits, or a constructive acquittal, and the "attachment" point is
significant only in determining some point after which a constructive ac-
quittal might be the result of a mistrial declaration. Hence, appeals of
other orders and judgments may be taken throughout the course of a
187. See supra note 109.
188. H.R.J. RES. 133, currently S.J.REs. 126.
189. Two Prosecution Appeal Amendments Survive, Richmond Times Dispatch, Jan. 24,
1984, at A7, Col. 1.
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trial. Forty-six states, the District of Columbia, and the federal courts
allow appeals of orders and judgments after the attachment of jeopardy.
Only Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island and West Virginia
restrict appeals to pre-jeopardy orders and judgments.190 Post-attachment
orders and judgments which are routinely appealable in other jurisdic-
tions include sentences, orders in arrest of judgment, the grant or denial
of a new trial, and modification of a jury verdict.
Arguments in favor of very limited prosecutorial appeals assert the de-
fendant's interest in finality. However, to assert that a defendant has an
interest in finality says very little. First, he would acknowledge no inter-
est in the finality of a conviction and would embrace the right to appeal.
More importantly, every defendant has an interest in the finality of any
order or judgment in his favor, however erroneous. The public has a coun-
tervailing interest in fair, legally correct proceedings "designed to end in
just judgments." 191 The balancing of these interests should produce a rule
which entitles the defendant to finality in an acquittal by his peers.'9 2
The public's interest in ensuring that a trial proceeds to a verdict on the
merits without substantial prejudicial error to either the state or the de-
fendant is at the root of our criminal justice system. In the face of wide-
spread public dissatisfaction with defendant-oriented criminal procedure,
one response of the Supreme Court has been to work the operation of the
double jeopardy clause back to a merits-orientation, thus diminishing its
power to produce technical acquittals 93 and opening the door to a
broader range of prosecutorial appeals. The people of Virginia are also
concerned about the swift and efficient administration of criminal justice
which adequately accounts for the people's right to determine guilt or
innocence and to punish accordingly.
A broad right of the commonwealth to appeal can be justified on nu-
merous grounds. Foremost, the law should be applied uniformly. Uni-
formity contributes to the integrity and organization of the judiciary as
part of the overall system of government. Broader appellate jurisdiction
190. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 278, § 28E (West 1981); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 490:4
(1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-24-23 (Supp. 1984); W. VA. CODE § 58-5-30 (1966).
191. Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689 (1949). The Court has also decribed to the public
an "interest in affording the prosecutor one full and fair opportunity to present his evidence
to an impartial jury." Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 505 (1978). Moreover, "the Gov-
ernment, like the defendant, is entitled to resolution of the case by verdict from the jury."
Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 326 (1984).
192. E.g., Note, Twice in Jeopardy: Prosecutorial Appeals of Sentences, 63 VA. L. REv.
325 (1977) (proposing a balancing test between the defendant's interest in finality and the
government's interest in uniformity in sentencing). Proponents of an expanded concept of
finality usually rely on one-shot prosecution balms and nostrums: "The double jeopardy
clause is a limitation on the number of proceedings in which the government can subject the
criminal defendant to the risk of penal sanctions." Id. at 325 (emphasis added). This is an
orphaned point of view. See supra note 115, United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978).
193. See supra notes 123, 126.
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in this supreme body ensures that more issues will be brought before it,
not just those decided against defendants. The state's citizens also have
an interest in the even application of the law. Uniformity will increase
public confidence in the legal system and stimulate public support and
respect for laws, lawyers, and judges.
Prosecutorial appeals also tend to control the conduct of individual
judges. The judicial process needs a system of checks which exposes the
actions of lower courts to appellate review. Without prosecutorial appeals,
however, there is no vehicle for such a check. The quality of judgments by
trial judges will be improved by the ability of both parties to appeal, even
if prosecutors do not in fact appeal frequently.
In individual cases, the state finds itself in the position of having a
right without a remedy. While the people are not entitled to a perfect
trial, they are at least entitled to a fair trial free of substantial prejudicial
error. Without the right to appeal, the people's right rests solely in the
discretion of the trial judge. Allowing the prosecutor to appeal is not a
drastic remedy to enforce this right to justice. Nor is it fundamentally
unfair to allow the prosecutor to appeal interlocutory rulings which could
not be appealed by the defendant.19 4 The defendant can appeal any al-
leged error which occurred during the course of the trial if he is con-
victed, but the prosecutor may not appeal after an acquittal. He must
take his appeals at stages of the trial before verdict if alleged error is to
be corrected. 195
The Virginia Constitution should be amended simply by deleting the
sentence which provides that: "No appeal shall be allowed to the Com-
monwealth in a case involving the life or liberty of a person, except that
an appeal by the Commonwealth may be allowed in any case involving
the violation of a law relating to the State revenue." Moreover, in view of
the broad statutory provisions managed by other states,1 98 the following
statute authorizing prosecutorial appeals is suggested once the constitu-
tional restriction is removed.
Appeals by Commonwealth
1. To the Court of Appeals.
A. Final Orders. An appeal may be taken by the commonwealth by
right to the court of appeals from:
194. United States v. Bitty, 208 U.S. 393, 400 (1907) (defendant is not constitutionally
entitled to appellate rights perfectly parallel to the government's).
195. The narrow Abney doctrine does allow interlocutory appeals by defendants of cer-
tain highly prejudicial orders. Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977).
196. See supra note 109.
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(1) an order quashing or dismissing 97 a charging instrument or any
count thereof,
(2) an order sustaining a plea in bar, including pleas of former jeop-
ardy, denial of speedy trial, and expiration of the statute of limitations,19
(3) an order granting or denying a new trial,199
(4) an order arresting judgment or setting aside a jury verdict,
(5) any post-verdict order or judgment prejudicial to a substantial in-
terest of the commonwealth, except that the commonwealth may not ap-
peal the grant of a motion for a directed acquittal based on the legal in-
sufficiency of the evidence. 00
B. Interlocutory Orders. The commonwealth may appeal interlocutory
orders if the Commonwealth's Attorney and Attorney General certify that
the appeal is not taken for purposes of delay and the order involves a
substantial question of law which will seriously impair or have the effect
of terminating a prosecution if not reversed.201
197. The words "quashing" and "dismissing" are both used in case a court interprets the
word "quash" narrowly as applicable only to highly technical defects in the form of the
indictment. See United States v. Carnes, 618 F.2d 68 (C.C. Ariz.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 929
(1980); Abbot v. Superior Court, 86 Ariz. 309, 345 P.2d 776 (1957).
198. The pleas in bar are specifically included because if sustained they discharge the
defendant without regard for the clearest indications of guilt, and the law surrounding
speedy trial and double jeopardy can be especially confusing and susceptible to abuse or
error.
199. Orders granting or denying a new trial may be more prejudicial than they first ap-
pear. Any such order embodies a resolution of some controversial issue raised during trial.
The defendant or his counsel may have engaged in conduct, for example, which intimidates
the jury or a witness, or which unfairly prejudices the proceeding by interjecting inadmissi-
ble, prejudicial statements concerning the prosecutor or a witness. The prosecutor may also
have good cause to protest the grant of a new trial if, for example, witnesses may be unavail-
able at a later trial or if the motion is sustained late in the trial after substantial expendi-
ture of resources and time. An order granting or denying a new trial would be difficult to
handle on appeal if given before verdict. The appellate court should have to hear and decide
the appeal quickly. In the District of Columbia an interlocutory appeal may be taken at any
point during a trial. The court declares a recess for a specified maximum time (90 days),
without selecting a new jury. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-104 (1981).
200. A(4) and (5) recognize a special solicitousness for the jury's prerogative to decide a
case, taking into account the Virginia procedural device of the directed acquittal. Post-ver-
dict orders prejudicial to a substantial interest of the state would include orders suspending
sentence, awarding probation, reducing a conviction to a lesser degree of the same offense,
or to a lesser included offense.
201. A good faith certification is thought necessary in the case of interlocutory appeals
because the pre-trial delay created by such appeals implicates the defendant's right to a
speedy trial. The constitutional parameters of the speedy trial guarantee, however, are very
flexible, and pre-trial appeals do not seriously threaten the defendant's right. The United
States Supreme Court has long recognized that what constitutes a speedy trial is not quanti-
fiable. Delay itself does not violate the right to a speedy trial, but it has been long settled
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(1) By right. The following interlocutory orders, occurring at any point
in a trial, may be appealed to the court of appeals by right:
(a) orders suppressing evidence or a confession on the grounds that the
use of such evidence at trial would violate the United States or Virginia
Constitutions, 20 2
(b) orders quashing an arrest or search warrant on constitutional or
statutory grounds.
(2) By petition. Any other interlocutory order may be the subject of a
petition for a writ of error to the court of appeals, except that after the
attachment of jeopardy the only interlocutory orders which may be the
subject of appellate review are those listed in subsections 1B(1)(a) and
1B(1)(b) of this statute.20 3
that delay can not be purposefully oppressive. E.g., Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354
(1957). Hence, a good faith certification that an interlocutory appeal has not been taken for
the purpose of delay addresses this most basic concern. Otherwise, delays of different
lengths of time are allowable in different situations, calling for an ad hoc evaluation of each
case. To assist the analysis of individual cases, the Supreme Court has identified three pur-
poses of the speedy trial guarantee: 1) to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration before
trial; 2) to minimize the anxiety of public accusation; and 3) to limit the possibility that
lengthy delay will impair the ability of a defendant to prepare his case. Smith v. Hooey, 393
U.S. 374 (1967); United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116 (1966). Using these criteria, courts
achieved such inconsistent results that the Supreme Court later felt compelled to devise a
more elaborate test. Although the Court declined to adopt a "bright-line" rule, based either
on a specific number of days, or the demand-waiver theory (which held that a defendant
waived his right to a trial as long as he did not formally demand trial), the Court did help
alleviate some confusion by devising a balancing test. The constitutional barometer was un-
veiled in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530-32 (1971), which provides for the balancing of
four elements: 1) the length of the delay; 2) the government's justification for the delay; 3)
whether the defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial, and how vigorously; and 4) actual
prejudice to the defendant, assessed in light of the three factors announced in Ewell and
Hooey. The continuing vitality of this four-prong Barker speedy trial test has been affirmed
recently by Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court in a forfeiture case, United States v.
Eight Thousand Eight Hundred and Fifty Dollars, 461 U.S. 555, 564 (1983).
202. H.R.J. RES. 126 allows interlocutory appeals of suppression orders based on the
grounds that evidence was obtained in a manner violative of a constitutional right. The
model statute is expressed in terms of evidence the use of which at trial would violate the
constitution. This wording reaches farther than H.R.J. RES. 126 in that it would allow ap-
peals of orders suppressing prior recorded testimony on the grounds that it violates the
"confrontation clause" of U.S. CONsT. amend. VI. The provision in the model statute also
takes account of the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine. Evidence obtained in a search
incident to arrest may be excluded as tainted if the arrest warrant itself is stricken as
unlawful.
203. This provision would provide additional insurance against frivolous appeals by
granting the appellate court discretion to refuse to entertain unworthy appeals. The limita-
tion to orders before the attachment of jeopardy would prevent the interruption of the trial
once it was underway, although such an interruption would not violate the double jeopardy
clause. Interlocutory orders which might be the subject of a writ of error under this section
include orders for a change of venue, for severance of offenses into separate trials, or the
exclusion of probative evidence on other than constitutional grounds.
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2. To the Supreme Court.
A. Appeals in the following instances shall be by right, and may only
be taken directly to the Supreme Court of Virginia:
(1) orders dismissing a charging instrument on the grounds that the
statute upon which it was founded is unconstitutional,0 4
(2) any order or judgment in subsections 1A or 1B(1) of this statute in
a capital case.2 °0
B. The commonwealth shall also have the right to appeal to the Su-
preme Court of Virginia from an order of the court of appeals which
reverses or vacates a conviction.
206
V. CONCLUSION
While other states have made enlightened developments in the area of
prosecutorial appeals, the evolution of law in this area in Virginia has
been retarded by article 6, section 1 of the constitution. The framers of
this provision intended to bar only appeals of acquittals and barred all
prosecutorial appeals in broad language because no other types of
prosecutorial appeals were foreseen.
A commission appointed by the Governor of Virginia studied the state
constitution and recommended that the prohibition of commonwealth's
appeals be removed as an issue "best left to the General Assembly rather
than frozen into the Constitution. '20 7 However, the provision has re-
mained and, in 1986, the Virginia General Assembly voted whether to
freeze into the constitution a replacement provision which reads even
more like a statute, H.J.R. 126.208 The state which once led this nation in
lawmaking and was home for the country's great legal giants is now fur-
thest behind in coming to grips with the concept of double jeopardy and
its relationship to appeals by the government.
204. Such constitutionality questions present the clearest demand for uniformity and an
authoritative pronouncement from the highest judicial body.
205. The highest judicial body should decide such grave questions as those which concern
a prosecution involving the death penalty.
206. In such a case, the Supreme Court need only reinstate the conviction if it disagrees
with the court of appeals. The words "reversing or vacating" are used to ensure that the
prosecution can appeal if the intermediate court reverses a conviction and purports to ac-
quit the defendant, or if it vacates a conviction and remands for a new trial. In either case,
substantial public resources will probably have been spent to obtain a conviction. This type
of appeal is merely an extension of the defendant's appeal from his conviction. See STAN-
DARDS, supra note 171, § 1.4, at 40.
207. See supra note 172, at 474-75.
208. In November 1986, a proposed amendment to the Virginia Constitution, which
would give the State a right to appeal certain preliminary dismissals and exclusions of evi-
dence in felony cases, was approved by voter referendum.
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It is submitted that the best course would be to start from scratch and
eliminate the clause barring appeals, which by the mere evolution of legal
language has taken on a meaning it was never intended to have. By statu-
torily specifying the conditions under which prosecutorial appeals will be
allowed, future General Assemblies will be able to conform the law to the
legal philosophy of their own time, and will not be bound by an outmoded
constitutional monolith erected to 1986 attitudes.
Roger D. Scott

